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Churches as First Amendment Institutions:

Of Sovereignty and Spheres
Paul Horwitz*
This Article offers a novel way of approaching the role of churches and
other religious entities within the framework of the FirstAmendment. Beyond
that, it offers a broader organizing structure for the legal treatment of "First
Amendment institutions"-entities whose fundamental role in shaping and contributing to public discourse entitles them to substantialautonomy in organizing
and regulating themselves. Drawing on the work of the neo-Calvinist writer
Abraham Kuyper, it encourages us to think about churches, and other First
Amendment entities, as "sovereign spheres": non-state institutions whose authority is ultimately coequal to that of the state. Under this model, a variety of
spheres, including churches and other non-state institutions, enjoy substantial
legal autonomy to carry out their sovereign purposes. The state is limited in its
authority to intervene in these spheres. However, a sphere sovereignty conception of the legal order retains a vital rolefor the state, which mediates between
the spheres and ensures that they do not abuse their power with respect to the
individuals subject to their authority.
The Article provides a detailed introduction to both the general field of
First Amendment institutionalism and the conception of sphere sovereignty offered by Kuyper. It argues that when these two seemingly disparate projects
meet, the combination offers a richer understanding of our constitutional structure and the role of First Amendment institutions within it. It also argues that
sphere sovereignty is closely related to many aspects of our existing constitutional history and to constitutional thought about the relationship between the
state and non-state associationsmore generally. Finally, it offers a number of
applications of this approach to current church-state doctrine, demonstrating
that a sphere sovereignty-oriented approach to the treatment of churches as
First Amendment institutions offers a legitimate, consistent, and conceptually
and doctrinally valuable way of resolving some of the most pressing issues in the
law of church and state.
[T]he First Amendment rests upon the premise that both religion and government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each is left free from the other
within its respective sphere.
- Justice Hugo Black'
[The First Amendment] acknowledges the existence of an arena of discourse,
activity, commitment, and organization for the ordering of life over which the

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law. I am grateful to the
Dean and Faculty of the University of Alabama School of Law for their support for this project. I thank the Institute for Constitutional Studies, Maeva Marcus, Judge Michael McConnell, Professor Mark Noll, and the participants in the 2008 ICS summer seminar for their
contributions to an early stage of this project. Thanks also to Bill Brewbaker, Marc DeGirolami, Kelly Horwitz, Christopher Lund, Steve Smith, Johan Van der Vyver, and Nicholas
Wolterstorff for their comments on drafts of this paper. Jennifer Michaelis provided excellent
research assistance and generous whip-cracking, for which I am painfully grateful. Finally,
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unquestioned sovereign in her own domestic sphere.
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state has no authority. It is a remarkable thing in human history when the authority governing coercive
power limits itself.
2
- Max L. Stackhouse

I.

INTRODUCTION

Movements need metaphors. Every age, in seeking "not merely the
solutions to problems, but [also] the kinds of problems which are to be
conceptualized as requiring solution,"3 requires its own imagery and its own
that beset it. Metaphors
way of understanding and resolving the issues
"shape as well as create political discourse."'4
The United States Constitution and its constituent parts have been fertile ground for the production of metaphors.' The First Amendment has been
a particularly fruitful source of metaphoric argument. Most notoriously, the
Speech Clause has been the staging ground for an ongoing debate over the
usefulness of the metaphor of the "marketplace of ideas. '
Metaphors are especially thick in the realm of law and religion. The
most important and controversial organizing metaphor for understanding the
interaction of church and state has been Thomas Jefferson's description of
the Establishment Clause as "building a wall of separation between Church
and State." 7 Scholars have argued over whether the "wall of separation" is

best understood in Jefferson's largely secularly oriented sense, or in the religiously oriented sense of Roger Williams, who wrote of the dangers to religion of "open[ing] a gap in the hedge or wall of separation between the
garden of the church and the wilderness of the world." 8 And they have
2 Max L.

Stackhouse, Religion, Rights, and the Constitution, in AN UNSETTLED ARENA:

RELIGION AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 92, 111 (Ronald C. White, Jr. & Albright G. Zimmerman
eds., 1990).
3
J.G.A. POCOCK, POLITICS, LANGUAGE, AND TIME: ESSAYS ON POLITICAL THOUGHT AND
HISTORY 13 (1989), quoted in Note, Organic and Mechanical Metaphors in Late EighteenthCentury American Political Thought, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1832, 1833 (1997).
'Note, supra note 3, at 1833.
' See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, The Idea of the Constitution: A Metaphor-morphosis, 37 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 170 (1987).
6 Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring). The
phrase is generally traced back to Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes,
J., dissenting) ("[Tihe best test of truth is the power of thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market."). For critical discussion of the phrase, see, for example, Stanley
Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1;Paul H. Brietzke,
How and Why the Marketplace of Ideas Fails, 31 VAL. U. L. REv. 951 (1997). See also Joseph
Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DuKEu L.J. 821, 821 (2008) (abstract) ("If
Amendment is the
any area of constitutional law has been defined by a metaphor, the First
area, and the 'marketplace of ideas' is the metaphor.").
' Letter from Thomas Jefferson to a Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan.
1, 1802), in MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, JOHN H. GARVEY, & THOMAS C. BERG, RELIGION AND
THE CONSTITUTION 42 (2d ed. 2006); see Daniel L. Dreisbach, Origins and Dangers of the
"Wall of Separation" Between Church and State, IMPRIMIS, Oct. 2006, at I ("No metaphor in
American letters has had a greater influence on law and policy than Thomas Jefferson's 'wall
of separation between church and state."').
I ROGER WILLIAMS, MR. CO-TON'S LErTER EXAMINED AND ANSWERED (1644), reprinted
in 1 COMPLETE WRITINGS OF ROGER WILLIAMS, at 313, 319 (Reuben Aldridge Guild & James
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argued over its usefulness for resolving conflicts between religious entities
and the state.9 Whatever one's position in this debate, it is easy to sympathize with the view that the "wall of separation" metaphor has become a
figurative barrier to a deeper understanding of the rich and complex relationship between church and state.
In this Article, I seek a new metaphor. In so doing, I reach for a new

way of thinking about issues of law and religion. In particular, I focus on an
increasingly important topic within the broader field: the role and constitutional status of religious entities.

The area of constitutional law governing religious entities is commonly
referred to as "church autonomy" doctrine.' 0 Church autonomy has become
an increasingly important site of contestation in the law of the Religion
Clauses. Calling the question of church self-governance "our day's most
pressing religious freedom challenge," Professor Richard Garnett has in-

sisted that "the church-autonomy question ... is on the front line" of religious freedom litigation."' Similarly, Professor Gerard Bradley has called the
field "the least developed, most confused of our church-state analyses, both

in the law and in informed commentary," and argued that church autonomy
"should be the flagship issue of church and state."' 2 Few writing on the
issue today doubt that it is an area badly in need of revision and reconciliation. A literal re-vision-a new way of seeing a vital but confused area of
law-is what I offer here.
The same metaphor may also enhance our understanding of an emerg-

ing field of constitutional theory in general, and the First Amendment in
particular. That field, "First Amendment institutionalism,"' 3 takes as its

central idea that First Amendment doctrine goes astray when it takes an "inHammond Trumbull eds., 1963). Williams's version of the wall metaphor was most prominently retrieved and examined in MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS
(1965).
9
See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 104-07 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (analyzing scholarly debate).
"0 See, e.g., Angela C. Carmella, ConstitutionalArguments in Church Bankruptcies: Why
JudicialDiscourse About Religion Matters, 29 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 435, 442 (2005); Angela
C. Carmella, Responsible Freedom Under the Religion Clauses: Exemptions, Legal Pluralism,
and the Common Good, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 403, 412 (2007); Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent and
Disestablishment: The Church-State Settlement in the Early American Republic, 2004 BYU L.
REV. 1385, 1592 [hereinafter Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment]; Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the
Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373 (1981).
" Richard W. Garnett, Pluralism, Dialogue, and Freedom: Professor Robert Rodes and
the Church-State Nexus, 22 J.L. & RELIGION 503, 521 (2006-2007) [hereinafter Garnett, Pluralism, Dialogue, and Freedom]. See also Richard W. Garnett, Church, State, and the Practice of Love, 52 VILL. L. REV. 281, 292 (2007) [hereinafter Garnett, Church, State, and the
Practice of Love].
12 Gerard V. Bradley, Church Autonomy in the ConstitutionalOrder: The End of Church
and State?, 49 LA. L. REV. 1057, 1061 (1989).
'3See, e.g., Paul Horwitz, Universities as FirstAmendment Institutions: Some Easy Answers and Hard Questions, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1497, 1518 (2007) [hereinafter Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions].
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stitutional[ly] agnostic[ ]" position toward speech controversies, one that
shows little "regard for the identity of the speaker or the institutional environment in which the speech occurs."' 14 It argues that courts should adopt an
approach to First Amendment issues that respects the vital role that various
First Amendment institutions play in contributing to the formation of public
discourse. '"

For several reasons, religious entities fit naturally into the study of First
Amendment institutions. First and most obviously, religious entities, like
the press, 16 are recognized in the text of the Constitution itself.'7 Second,
there can be little doubt that religious entities-churches, religious charities,
and a variety of other bodies-have played a central role in our history18 and
continue to do so today. The growth in scope of both religious activity and
governmental power ensure that religious entities will be increasingly important, and that they will be in greater tension with various regulatory
authorities. '"

Finally, the Supreme Court's increasingly neutrality-oriented approach
to the Religion Clauses, which is exemplified by Employment Division v.
Smith,20 raises the question whether neutrality simplifies the Court's constitutional doctrine. Or do the courts, in seeking a seemingly elegant and uniform approach, cause more problems by "miss[ing], or mis-describ[ing],
the role of institutions and institutional context" in religious life as it is experienced on a real-world basis?21 The incoherence in this area makes it
particularly ripe for exploration within the framework of First Amendment
institutionalism. There are, in short, any number of reasons why students of
First Amendment institutionalism should concern themselves with religious
entities-and, conversely, why scholars who are interested in the legal status
of religious entities should consider the lessons of First Amendment
institutionalism.

"4Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 HARV. L.
84, 120 (1998) [hereinafter Schauer, Principles].
"5See, e.g., Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1061, 1142
(2008) [hereinafter Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference].
16See generally Paul Horwitz, "Or of the [Blog]," 11 NEXUS 45 (2006) [hereinafter
Horwitz, [Blog]] (examining the press as a First Amendment institution and exploring the
relevance of this concept to the emergence of blogs and other new-media entities).
'7 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
18See, e.g., Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment,supra note 10.
'9 See Thomas C. Berg, Religious Structures Under the Federal Constitution, in RELIGIOUs ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY OF IDENTITY, LIBERTY, AND THE LAW
129, 129 (James A. Serritella et al. eds., 2006) ("Churches and other religious organizations
are bound to interact with government. The conditions of modem America ensure that."); Ira
C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our Constitutional
Order, 47 VILL. L. REV. 37, 39 (2002).
20 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
21 Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches Matter? Towards an Institutional Understandingof
REV.

the Religion Clauses, 53 VILL. L. REv. 273, 284 (2008) [hereinafter Garnett, Do Churches
Matter?].

2009]

Churches as First Amendment Institutions

As yet, however, this project has barely begun. Although a number of
scholars have written powerfully on the nature of religious entities and the

role of religious autonomy in the Religion Clauses, their insights are not tied
to a broader understanding of the role played by a variety of First Amendment institutions. 22 First Amendment institutionalists, on the other hand,
have not yet turned their full attention specifically to religious entities. Pro-

fessor Richard Garnett has made an ambitious effort to begin applying the
lessons of First Amendment institutionalism to religious entities. 23 Although
his contributions to this area are essential, he modestly acknowledges that
"[a] lot of work remains to be done." 24 This Article aims to push the pro-

ject forward.
The primary source for the metaphor I offer here lies in neither American nor English constitutional thought. It is instead based in the theology

and politics of nineteenth-century Holland. Its primary author is a figure
who may be somewhat obscure to the American legal academy, but who is
well known beyond it: the neo-Calvinist Dutch theologian, journalist, and
politician Abraham Kuyper. The metaphor derives from Kuyper's signature
intellectual contribution to the study of religion and politics-his doctrine of
"Souvereiniteit in Eigen Kring," or "sphere sovereignty."

Sphere sovereignty is the view that human life is "differentiated into
distinct spheres," each featuring "institutions with authority structures specific to those spheres. '25 Under this theory, these institutions are literally
sovereign within their own spheres. Each of these spheres, which include

religious entities but embrace others besides, has its "own God-given authority. [None] is subordinate to the other.

26

These institutions serve as a

counterweight to the state, ensuring that it "may never become an octopus,
which stifles the whole of life.

'27

At the same time, they are themselves

22 See, e.g., Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Organizationsand Free Exercise: The Surprising Lessons of Smith, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1633 [hereinafter Brady, Religious Organizations
and Free Exercise]; Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment, supra note 10.
23 See Garnett, Do Churches Matter?, supra note 21; Richard W. Garnett, Religion and
Group Rights: Are Churches (Just) Like the Boy Scouts?, 22 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT.
515 (2007) [hereinafter Garnett, Religion and Group Rights]; see also Garnett, Church, State,
and the Practiceof Love, supra note 11; Richard W. Gamett, The Freedom of the Church, 4 J.
CATH. Soc. THOUGHT 59 (2007); Garnett, Pluralism, Dialogue, and Freedom, supra note 11.
24 Garnett, Do Churches Matter?, supra note 21, at 284.
25 Nicholas Wolterstorff, Abraham Kuyper on the Limited Authority of Church and State,
Presentation at Federalist Society Conference: The Things That Are Not Caesar's: Religious
Organizations as a Check on the Authoritarian Pretensions of the State 7 (Mar. 14, 2008)
(transcript on file with the author) [hereinafter Wolterstorff, The Things That Are Not Caesar's]. I am grateful to Professor Wolterstorff for sharing this illuminating paper with me.
26 Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Tort Law and Intermediate Communities: Calvinist and Catholic
Insights, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT 486, 488 (Michael W. McConnell,
Robert F. Cochran, Jr. & Angela C. Carmella eds., 2001) [hereinafter Cochran, Tort Law and
Intermediate Communities].
27 ABRAHAM KUYPER, LECTURES ON CALVINISM 96 (photo. reprint 2007) (1931) [hereinafter KOYPER, LECTURES].
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limited to the proper scope of their authority.2" Kuyper's sphere sovereignty
approach thus does not treat church and state as antagonists. Rather, it sees
a profusion of organically developed institutions and associations, including
both church and state, operating within their own authority structures and
barred from intruding into one another's realms. Although this appears to be
a theory of a limited state,29 it is also a theory of the limits of religious
entities. Within this framework, the state plays a central role in maintaining
boundaries and mediating between the various spheres.30
The theory of sphere sovereignty requires elaboration and unpacking.
But this brief preview should be suggestive enough of the contribution that
Kuyperian sphere sovereignty might make to an understanding of churchstate relations and to the broader universe of First Amendment institutions.
The plan of the Article is as follows. In Part II, I offer a brief description of the project of First Amendment institutionalism. In Part III, I discuss
Kuyper's theory of sphere sovereignty and note its similarity to some aspects
of early and later American political and constitutional thought. Part IV ties
the preceding sections together by assessing the ways in which sphere sovereignty might contribute to our understanding of churches as First Amendment institutions. Part V fills in the picture with a series of applications,
examining some of the doctrinal implications of treating churches as "sovereign spheres" or First Amendment institutions. Part VI offers a brief
conclusion.
II.

FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONALISM

31

First Amendment institutionalism begins with an observation about the
distinction between policy and principle, 32 or between legal and prelegal categories.3 3 At times, "law's categories are parasitic on the categories of the
28 Wolterstorff, The Things That Are Not Caesar's, supra note 25, at 11 ("Kuyper thought
that in a modem well-functioning society, the authority of an organization should be limited to
activities within one particular sphere.").
29 Some modem writers have found Kuyper appealing precisely because he seems to call
for a relatively weak state. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L.
REV. 856, 895 (1997). Although it is true that Kuyper's concept of sphere sovereignty opposes
a totalizing state, it is far from clear that the state, in Kuyper's view, cannot be vigorous or
activist. See, e.g., Richard J. Mouw, Some Reflections on Sphere Sovereignty, in RELIGION,
PLURALISM, AND PUBLIC LIFE: ABRAHAM KUYPER'S LEGACY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

87, 89 (Luis E. Lugo ed., 2000) ("[O]ne can make room [in Kuyper's description of the state]
... for a fairly energetic interventionist pattern by government.").
30 See,

e.g.,

KUYPER, LECTURES,

supra note 27, at 92-97.

3' Much of what follows in this Part is spelled out at considerably greater length in Paul

Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 461 (2005) [hereinafter Horwitz,
Grutter's FirstAmendment]; Horwitz, Universities as FirstAmendment Institutions, supra note
13; and Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, supra note 15.
32 See, e.g., Horwitz, Grutter's FirstAmendment, supra note 3 1, at 564; Schauer, Principles, supra note 14, at 112.
33 See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Institutions as Legal and Constitutional Categories, 54
UCLA L. REv. 1747, 1748-49 (2007) [hereinafter Schauer, Institutions].
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prelegal and extralegal world. '34 Frequently, however, the law reaches "real
things only indirectly, through categories, abstractions and doctrines."35 The
law's tendency is to seek to understand the world in strictly legal terms, 3 6
viewing the law through a lens of "juridical categories"37 in which all speakers and all factual questions are translated into a series of purely legal inquiries.3" In short, law's tendency is to seek an acontextual way of understanding
and carving up the universe.
This tendency is especially apparent in the law of the First Amendment.
Religion Clause doctrines, such as the Court's ruling in Employment Division v. Smith, which I noted above, are but one example of this tendency
toward acontextuality and institution-agnosticism in First Amendment doctrine. It is apparent, too, in the Supreme Court's refusal to grant special
privileges to the press,3 9 despite the embarrassing presence in the constitu-

tional text of the Press Clause. It is evident in the First Amendment doctrine
of content neutrality, "the cornerstone of the Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence," 4 which by definition focuses on the content of the
speech and not the institutional identity of the speaker. Indeed, this "reluctance with respect to institutional categories" replicates itself across a host
of constitutional doctrines. 41 However, we can for now focus in particular
on the Court's "pattern of treating First Amendment doctrine as institution42
ally blind.
This institutional blindness has some salutary aspects for First Amendment doctrine. For example, the primary message of content neutrality doctrine is that "government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter or its content. '43 It makes government,
not the speaker, the protagonist of the First Amendment drama.44 If our concern is with discriminatory or censorious state action, then it might make
sense to craft a doctrine that is institutionally insensitive. We would not
want government to use the speaker's identity as a proxy for hostility to its
message, 45 or to favor and disfavor particular institutions out of sympathy or
antipathy to those institutions, rather than out of some more thoughtful and
34

ld. at 1748.
"5Garnett, Do Churches Matter?, supra note 21, at 275.
36 Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, supra note 15, at 1063.
17 Schauer, Principles, supra note 14, at 119; see also Frederick Schauer, Prediction
and
Particularity,78 B.U. L. REV. 773, 781-85 (1998).
38See Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, supra note 31, at 564.
39 See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
40Steven J. Heyman, Spheres of Autonomy: Reforming the Content Neutrality Doctrine in
First Amendment Jurisprudence, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 647, 650 (2002).
4"
Schauer, Institutions, supra note 33, at 1756.
2
4 Id. at 1754.
41Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
4 See, e.g., David McGowan, Approximately Speech, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1416, 1423
(2005) (describing the view that "the intention of the government is the key to free speech
analysis" as being "the most prominent free speech intuition").
"5See Dale Carpenter, The Value of Institutions and the Value of Free Speech, 89 MINN. L.
REV. 1407, 1409-10 (2005).
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sensitive analysis of their social role. 46 Every such "line[ ] of demarcation"
might be "an opening for the .dangers of government partisanship, entrenchment, and incompetence.

'47

At the same time, the government is not the only protagonist in First
Amendment doctrine. First Amendment speakers, in all their obvious diversity, are also a vital part of the equation. And here, institutional blindness
may create significant practical and doctrinal problems. Practically, it often
may not be the case that all speakers are the same for all purposes. At times,
it may matter that speech takes place in a particular institutional setting. As
the Supreme Court observed in Grutter v. Bollinger,41 "context matters." 49

Thus, the broad and largely institutionally insensitive categories of public
forum doctrine may be "out of place" in the context of cases involving public libraries,50 as well as in cases involving public broadcasters.' Or the
content neutrality doctrine, which was meant precisely to apply across the
panoply of human expression, may offer a poor fit where the speaker in
question is a public arts funding
body whose existence depends upon the
2

making of content distinctions.1
In these circumstances, the practical difficulties lead ineluctably to doctrinal difficulties. The distinctions between various speech contexts and institutions may lead courts to be over- or under-protective of particular
institutions in ways that do not serve either First Amendment values or the
broader world of public discourse. 53 Another possibility is that this acontex4
tual doctrinal approach will collapse when applied to a factual context.1
The courts will bend and distort existing doctrine to take account of institutional variation, while still trying to preserve some sense of their attachment
to acontextual legal categories. The result will be (and already is in the view
of many) increasing doctrinal incoherence.5
46

See id. at 1410-11.
IId. at 1411. Some writers have argued that this danger has already manifested itself in
the "extreme institutional tailoring" of free speech doctrine with respect to prisons, workplaces, and public schools. See Scott A. Moss, Students and Workers and Prisoners- Oh, My!
A CautionaryNote About Excessive Institutional Tailoring of First Amendment Doctrine, 54
UCLA L. REV. 1635, 1635 (2007); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution in Authoritarian
Institutions, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 441 (1999).
48 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
49 Id. at 327.
50 United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 205 (2003).
5' See Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 672-73 (1998).
52 See Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
11See Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions, supra note 13, at 1512;
Frederick Schauer, Towards an InstitutionalFirst Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1256, 127073 (2005) [hereinafter Schauer, InstitutionalFirst Amendment].
51 See Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions, supra note 13, at 1507.
" See id. at 1508-09; Schauer, Institutional FirstAmendment, supra note 53, at 1270-73;
Schauer, Principles, supra note 14, at 86-87 (noting "an intractable tension between free
speech theory [in general] and judicial methodology [in particular cases]" and suggesting
that "the increasingly obvious phenomenon of institutional differentiation will prove progressively injurious to the Court's efforts to confront the full range of free speech issues"); see also
Robert C. Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1249, 1250-51
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First Amendment institutionalism seeks a way out of this fix by encouraging the rebuilding of First Amendment doctrine. It counsels a "bottomup, institutionally sensitive approach that openly 'takes... institutions seriously."' 56 It suggests that "in numerous areas of constitutional doctrine an
institution-specific approach might be preferable to the categorical approach
that now exists, or might at least be taken more seriously than it has been up
to now."57 To put it more theoretically, it argues that First Amendment doctrine must "generate a perspicuous understanding of the necessary material
and normative dimensions of ...[various] forms of social order and of the
relationship of speech to these values and dimensions.""8 One implication of
this approach is that the courts would be more willing to openly acknowledge that particular speech institutions-universities, the press, religious as-

sociations, libraries, and perhaps others-"play a fundamental role in our
system of free speech."59 They would understand that some speech institutions are key contributors to our system of public discourse and that "the

freedom of expression is not only enjoyed by and through, but also depends
on the existence and flourishing of," these institutions.60

The justification for giving special recognition to particular First
Amendment institutions is ultimately both instrumental and intrinsic. Instrumentally, it argues that these institutions are important sites for the formation and promotion of public discourse; valuing these institutions thus
enhances public discourse and, ultimately, freedom of speech for everyone.
Intrinsically, it argues that these institutions are natural features of the social
landscape and that the courts would do well to recognize this fundamental
fact.6
(1995) (arguing that the Court's free speech doctrine is "intemal[ly] incoheren[t]" and "will
continue to flounder until it focuses clearly on the nature and constitutional significance of
[particular social] practices").
56 Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, supra note 15, at 1142 (quoting Horwitz, Grutter's
First Amendment, supra note 31, at 589). I take no firm stand on whether the doctrine that
results would be highly particularistic and anti-formalist, or whether it would be as formalist as
the current, institutionally agnostic version of First Amendment doctrine with different and
more institutionally aware formal categories. I take it that Professor Schauer would prefer the
latter. See Schauer, Institutions, supra note 33, at 1763-64. My own inclinations tend somewhat toward the former approach. What matters for both of our purposes is that the linedrawing that courts should engage in ought to be more institutionally sensitive and less reliant
on purely legal categories.
" Schauer, Institutions, supra note 33, at 1758.
" Post, supra note 55, at 1280-81.
" Horwitz, Grutter's FirstAmendment, supra note 31, at 589. I should note that this is not
the only possible version of First Amendment institutionalism. Professor Schauer, for example, suggests that an institutional approach should be more sensitive to institutions in general,
and need not focus only on what I call "First Amendment institutions." See Schauer, Institutions, supra note 33, at 1757 n.51 ("[A] thorough institutional approach ... would not require
that the institutions marked out for institution-specific treatment be institutions, like universities, that are connected with some area of special constitutional concern.").
6 Garnett, Do Churches Matter?, supra note 21, at 274.
61 Cf. Schauer, Institutions, supra note 33, at 1762 ("[T]here may be some reason to
believe that the very nature of institutions as institutions gives their boundaries a stickiness that
we do not see in some of the other empirical aspects of legal rules.").
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One other insight is important here, both because of its relationship to
this Article's focus on religious entities and because it may allay some objections to the First Amendment institutionalism project. One possible concern
about recognizing the particular value of specific First Amendment institutions 62 is that such an approach allows those institutions to become a law
unto themselves. It is thus important to emphasize one other feature that
characterizes most, if not all, First Amendment institutions: these institutions are already significantly self-governing. They operate within a thick
web of norms, values, constraints, and professional practices that channel
and restrain their actions. 63 Those institutional norms and practices are
themselves often shaped in ways that serve public discourse. Thus, even in
the absence of positive law we might expect institutional practices to serve
the speech-enhancing and freedom-protective role that we now expect institutionally agnostic First Amendment doctrine itself to play. An institutionalist approach to the First Amendment that focuses on particular institutions
would thus take as its starting point the norms, values, and practices of the
institutions themselves. 64 This would in turn help to define the boundaries of
such institutions and set appropriate constraints for them.
An institutionalist approach to First Amendment doctrine could take
several possible forms. 65 At its weakest level, it might simply encourage the
courts to "explicitly, transparently, and self-consciously" acknowledge the
importance of institutions. 66 Under this approach, courts would incorporate
a substantial degree of deference to the factual claims of those institutions in
considering how present doctrine should apply to them.67 Since the courts
sometimes (if rarely) already do something of the sort, this is not a dramatic
68
change in their current approach.
Alternatively, courts could adopt a more stringent form of First Amendment institutionalism. On this approach, they would treat particular First
'69
Amendment institutions as "substantially autonomous ... within the law.

This form of institutionalism would still allow for some constitutionally pre-

62 Again, not all versions of First Amendment institutionalism necessarily take this approach. See supra note 59 (discussing Schauer's broader account of First Amendment
institutionalism).
63See, e.g., Horwitz, Grutter's FirstAmendment, supra note 31, at 572-73; Horwitz, Universities as FirstAmendment Institutions, supra note 13, at 1511; see also Blocher, supra note
6, at858-59, 864.
6 See Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, supra note 31, at 573.
65See, e.g., Horwitz, Universitiesas FirstAmendment Institutions, supra note 13, at 151623. I have also found useful Perry Dane's account of the numerous potential forms of abstention, deference, and recognition that make up religious autonomy. See Perry Dane, The Varieties of Religious Autonomy, in CHURCH AUTONOMY: A COMPARATIVE SURVEY 117 (Gerhard
Robbers ed., 2001).
6 Horwitz, [Blog], supra note 16, at 61.
67See Horwitz, Universities as FirstAmendment Institutions, supra note 13, at 1516.
68 See Schauer, Institutions, supra note 33, at 1753-54; Horwitz, Universities as First
Amendment Institutions, supra note 13, at 1516-17.
69 Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions, supra note 13, at 1518.
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scribed limits to the institutions' autonomy,70 but it would be a distinct step

up from a weaker form of First Amendment institutionalism.
Still more strongly, courts might employ an approach to First Amendment institutions that treats them as genuinely "jurisgenerative" institutions.71 On this reading, they are sites of law in almost, or entirely, a formal
2
sense. Their decisions would take on a jurisdictional character,1 such that

any decision taken by a First Amendment institution within the proper scope
of its operation-a question that would itself be decided with some defer73
-would be subject to a form of "de facto nonence to that institution
4
7

justiciability.'
Under this approach, First Amendment institutions would be treated as
"legally autonomous institutions [that] enjoy a First Amendment right to
operate on a largely self-regulating basis and outside the supervision of external legal regimes."75 Any limits to the scope of their autonomy would be

largely organic; they would be shaped in ways that are informed by and
reflect the institutions' own ends, norms, and practices. Courts would rely

heavily on the propensity of the institutions to apply self-discipline, driven
institutional norms and their own internal enforcement
by their own
76
mechanisms.

This fairly brief summary cannot canvass all the possible variations on
First Amendment institutionalism or the potential problems with such an approach.77 But it is worth noting that First Amendment institutionalism is a
growth stock in contemporary constitutional scholarship. It has been applied
to universities," the press,79 private associations,80 commercial and profes-

70 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328; see Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions,
supra note 13, at 1518.
7' See Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 11-19
(1983).
72 See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The ConstitutionalRights of Private Governments, 78
N.Y.U. L. REV. 144, 186-87 (2003); see also, e.g., Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause
as a Structural Restraint on Governmental Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1998) [hereinafter
Esbeck, Restraint on Governmental Power]; Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a
Structural Restraint: Validations and Ramifications, 18 J.L. & POL. 445 (2002).
73 See, e.g., Horwitz, Universities as FirstAmendment Institutions,supra note 13, at 1542;
Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, supra note 15, at 1129-30; see also Blocher, supra note 6,
at 863.
74C. Thomas Dienes, When the First Amendment Is Not Preferred: The Military and
Other "Special Contexts," 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 779, 819 (1988).
71Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions, supra note 13, at 1520.
76 See, e.g., Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, supra note 15, at 1138; Horwitz, Universities as FirstAmendment Institutions, supra note 13, at 1555-56.
77 For a response to some potential difficulties of First Amendment institutionalism, see
Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions, supra note 13.
78 See Horwitz, Grutter's FirstAmendment, supra note 31; Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, supra note 15; Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions, supra note 13;
Frederick Schauer, Is There a Right to Academic Freedom?, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 907 (2006).
79 See Horwitz, [Blog], supra note 16.
80 See Hills, supra note 72.
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84
sional speech,8 election law,82 state action doctrine,83 securities regulation,
and a variety of other First Amendment topics." It speaks to a dissatisfaction with the current, institutionally agnostic approach to First Amendment
doctrine, and perhaps beyond that to an interest in the role that institutions
might play across a range of constitutional doctrines.86
First Amendment institutionalism does not operate in isolation from
other developing issues and trends in constitutional theory. Its concern with
devolving regulation to smaller social units suggests a kinship with federalism scholarship, and with those scholars who have argued for an even

greater degree of "localism" in legal discourse.87 It should strike a sympa-

thetic chord with those who have argued for the protection of intermediary
associations, 8 and specifically scholars who have argued for the usefulness
of the doctrine of subsidiarity.89 First Amendment institutionalism emphasizes the ways in which courts might give regulatory authority to a variety of
expert local actors rather than impose top-down legal norms. In doing so, it
echoes the concerns of both "democratic experimentalism" 9° and theories of
"reflexive" or "autopoietic" law, which envision society as consisting of a
series of subsystems, each regulated primarily by "specifying procedures
and basic organizational norms geared towards fostering self-regulation
81 See Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 771 (1999); Michael R. Siebecker,
Building a "New Institutional" Approach to Corporate Speech, 59 ALA. L. REV. 247 (2008).
812See Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes, Electoral Exceptionalism and the First
Amendment, 77 TEX. L. REv. 1803 (1999).
83 See David Fagundes, State Actors as First Amendment Speakers, 100 Nw. U. L. REV.
1637 (2006).
84 See Michael R. Siebecker, Corporate Speech, Securities Regulation, and an Institutional Approach to the First Amendment, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 613 (2006).
85 See, e.g., Mark D. Rosen, Institutional Context in ConstitutionalLaw: A CriticalExamination of Term Limits, Judicial Campaign Codes, and Anti-PornographyOrdinances, 21 J.L.
& POL. 223 (2005).
86 See generally Symposium, Constitutional"Niches": The Role of InstitutionalContext in
ConstitutionalLaw, 54 UCLA L. REv. 1463 (2007).
87See, e.g., Mark D. Rosen, The Surprisingly Strong Case for Tailoring Constitutional
Principles, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1513 (2005); Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in
the Doctrine and Discourse of Religious Liberty, 117 HARV. L. REv. 1810 (2004); Ira C. Lupu
& Robert
W. Tuttle, Federalism and Faith, 56 EMORY L.J. 19 (2006).
88
See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, The Story of Henry Adams's Soul: Education and the
Expression of Associations, 85 MirN. L. REV. 1841 (2001).
89See, e.g., Peter Widulski, Subsidiarity andProtest: The Law School's Mission in Grutter
and FAIR, 42 GONZ. L. REV. 415 (2006-2007); Kyle Duncan, Subsidiarity and Religious Establishments in the United States Constitution, 52 VILL. L. REV. 67 (2007); Robert K. Vischer,
Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance: Beyond Devolution, 35 IND. L. REv. 103 (2001).
90 See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 283-88 (1998) (arguing for "a new model of institutionalized democratic deliberation that responds to the conditions of modem life," in which judicial
review and other devices of government would "leave room for experimental elaboration and
revision to accommodate varied and changing circumstances" while still protecting individual
rights); Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv.
875, 961, 978 (2003) (discussing the ways in which courts can "devolve[ ] deliberative authority for fully specifying norms to local actors" instead of "laying down specific rules" for
the conduct of various public and private actors).
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within distinct spheres of social activities." 91 Finally, First Amendment institutionalism might be seen as a specific application of constitutional decision rules theory. This theory argues that given the purported gap between

constitutional "meaning" and constitutional "implementation," we should
understand the Supreme Court's constitutional role and doctrine not as "a
search for the Constitution's one true meaning" but as a "multifaceted one of
'implementing' constitutional norms." 92
In short, First Amendment institutionalism is an increasingly vital and
viable project. However, it is still a relatively new avenue of inquiry and
more work needs to be done. Much more needs to be said about the role of

religious entities as First Amendment institutions, which is the primary object of the remainder of this Article. But first, First Amendment institutionalism must be situated within the broader framework of constitutional law
and theory. 93 To that end, let me turn to Kuyper and his theory of sphere

sovereignty.
Il.

A.

SPHERE SOVEREIGNTY

Sphere Sovereignty Described

It may seem odd to construct a theory of American religious freedom,
and American constitutional structure more generally, around the thinking of
a Dutchman who did not visit the United States until the waning years of the
nineteenth century. 94 Certainly a number of factors combine to minimize
Kuyper's potential influence in American religious and political thought. 95
9' William E. Scheuerman, Reflexive Law and the Challenges of Globalization, 9 J. POL.
PHIL. 81, 84 (2001); see also JEAN L. COHEN, REGULATING INTIMACY: A NEW LEGAL PARA-

(2002); GUNTHER ThUBNER, LAW AS AN AutrroPoirc SYSTEM (1993); Hugh Baxter,
Autopoiesis and the "Relative Autonomy" of Law, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1987 (1998); Michael
C. Doff, The Domain of Reflexive Law, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 384 (2003); Gunther Teubner,
Substantive andReflexive Elements in Modem Law, 17 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 256 (1983). For an
expanded treatment of the relationship between First Amendment institutionalism and democratic experimentalism, reflexive law, and autopoiesis, see Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, supra note 31, at 574-79.
DIGM

92

RICHARD

H.

FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION

5 (2001). For citations to

the relevant literature and a discussion of how constitutional decision rules theory intersects
with First Amendment institutionalism, see Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, supra note 15,
at 1140-46.
9' See Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, supra note 15, at 1145.
9 Elaine Storkey, Sphere Sovereignty and the Anglo-American Tradition, in Lugo, ed.,
supra note 29, at 189; cf. J. BUDZISZEWSKI, EVANGELICALS IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE: FOUR
FORMATIVE VOICES ON POLITICAL THOUGHT AND ACTION

55 (2006) ("A Dutch theological

liberal would seem unlikely to become a major influence on conservative American evangelicals of the following century, but Abraham Kuyper was an unlikely sort of person.").
95
See, e.g., Max Stackhouse, Preface to RELIGION, PLURALISM, AND PUBLIC LIFE: ABRAHAM KUYPER'S LEGACY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY,

supra note 29, at xi, xii-xiii; Wayne

Allen Kobes, Sphere Sovereignty and the University: Theological Foundations of Abraham
Kuyper's View of the University and Its Role in Society 2-3 (June 15, 1993) (unpublished
Ph.D. thesis, Florida State University) (on file with author).
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Nevertheless, Kuyper has enjoyed wide influence in many circles.96 A number of scholars have addressed his call for sphere sovereignty in various
fields of study, including not only theology but also social science and political theory.97

Kuyper has not been ignored by the American legal academy. 9 He has
made scattered appearances in American legal writings-some at significant
length, 99 some in passing, 1°° and some only indirectly.' 0' Still, citations to
96

e.g.,

A FREE CHURCH, A HOLY NATION: ABRAHAM KUYPER'S AMERI(2001); PETER S. HESLAM, CREATING A CHRISTIAN WORLDVIEW:
ABRAHAM KUYPER'S LECTURES ON CALVINISM 1-8 (1998); Nicholas P. Wolterstorff, Abraham
Kuyper (1837-1920), in THE TEACHINGS OF MODERN PROTESTANTISM ON LAW, POLITICS, &
HUMAN NATURE 29, 63-64 (John Witte Jr. & Frank S. Alexander eds., 2007) [hereinafter
See,

JOHN BOLT,

CAN PUBLIC THEOLOGY Xi

TEACHINGS
OF MODERN PROTESTANTISM].
97

See, e.g., RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 175 (1984).
98 The most prominent students of Kuyper in the American legal academy are John Witte,
Johan van der Vyver, and David Caudill. See, e.g., JOHN WrrTE, JR., THE REFORMATION OF
RIGHTS: LAW, RELIGION, AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN EARLY MODERN CALVINISM 321-29 (2007)
[hereinafter WrTE, REFORMATION OF RIGHTS]; David S. Caudill, A Calvinist Perspective on
Faith in Legal Scholarship, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 19, 23 (1997); David S. Caudill, Augustine and
Calvin: Post-Modernism and Pluralism, 51 VIL. L. REV. 299, 300-02 (2006) [hereinafter
Caudill, Augustine and Calvin]; David S. Caudill, Disclosing Tilt: A PartialDefense of Critical Legal Studies and a ComparativeIntroduction to the Philosophy of the Law-Idea, 72 IOWA
L. REV. 287, 333 (1987); Johan D. van der Vyver, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Constitutional and InternationalLaw, 5 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 321, 344-46 (1991); Johan D. Van der
Vyver, Sphere Sovereignty of Religious Institutions: A Contemporary Calvinistic Theory of
Church-State Relations, in Robbers, ed., supra note 65, at 645 [hereinafter Van der Vyver,
Sphere Sovereignty]. Both Van der Vyver and Caudill are identified as much, or more, with
the thinking of a student and intellectual descendant of Kuyper, Herman Dooyeweerd, as they
are with Kuyper himself. See, e.g., Caudill, Augustine and Calvin, supra note 98, at 301.
9 See, e.g., Armand H. Matheny Antommaria, Jehovah's Witnesses, Roman Catholicism,
and Neo-Calvinism: Religion and State Intervention in Parental,Medical Decision Making, 8
J.L. & FAM. STUD. 293, 312-14 (2006); Jeffrey M. Bryan, Sexual Morality: An Analysis of
Dominance Feminism, Christian Theology, and the First Amendment, 84 U. DET. MERCY L.
REV. 655, 691-94 (2007); Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Catholic and Evangelical Supreme Court
Justices: A Theological Analysis, 4 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 296, 302-08 (2006); Cochran, Tort Law
and Intermediate Communities, supra note 26; Robin W. Lovin, Church and State in an Age of
Globalization, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 9-10 (2002); Robin W. Lovin, Religion and Political
Pluralism, 27 Miss. C. L. REv. 91, 97 (2007-2008); David A. Skeel, Jr., The Unbearable
Lightness of ChristianLegal Scholarship, 57 EMORY L.J. 1471, 1506-09 (2008).
I"o See, e.g., Kwame Anthony Appiah, Global Citizenship, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2375,
2388 (2007); Marci A. Hamilton, Religious Institutions, the No-Harm Doctrine,and the Public
Good, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1099, 1181 [hereinafter Hamilton, Religious Institutions]; John
Copeland Nagle, The EvangelicalDebate Over Climate Change, 5 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 53, 80
& 83 (2008); C. Scott Pryor, God's Bridle: John Calvin's Application of Natural Law, 22 J.L.
& RELIGION 225, n. 22 (2006-2007); Peter Judson Richards, "The Law Written in Their
Hearts"?: Rutherfordand Locke on Nature, Government and Resistance, 18 J.L. & RELIGION

151, 181 (2002).

'01See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Tournament at the Intersection of Business and
Legal Ethics, 1 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 909, n. 9 (2004) (discussing sphere sovereignty without
referring directly to Kuyper); David J. Herring, Rearranging the Family: Diversity, Pluralism,
Social Tolerance and Child Custody Disputes, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 205, n. 48 (1997)
(same). In keeping with Van der Vyver's focus on Dooyeweerd rather than Kuyper, see supra
note 98, he regularly discusses sphere sovereignty without referencing Kuyper. See, e.g.,
Johan D. van der Vyver, Limitations of Freedom of Religion or Belief: International Law
Perspectives, 19 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 499, 518 & 525 (2005).
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Kuyper amount to a mere handful over a span of decades, many of them
brief in scope and shallow in treatment. Thus, it is understandable that
David Skeel should write that "the use of his work in contemporary American legal scholarship has tended to be more impressionistic than sustained,
and Christian legal scholars have not employed it as a base camp for a sustained normative account."' 02 I would argue that scholars of any stripe have
failed to provide a persistent analysis of Kuyper's work. This Part provides
such a sustained account, focusing in particular on Kuyper's concept of
sphere sovereignty.
Before proceeding any further, I should address a possible question:
does it matter that Kuyper' s concept of sphere sovereignty is a Christian, and
specifically Calvinist, theory of the social structure? There are two potential
objections: divorcing Kuyper's theory from its Calvinist context robs it of its
force, and taking a "Christian" approach to the Constitution, even if it is
only Christian in derivation, is either out of bounds or of interest to only a
parochial few. I think these objections are mistaken. I offer up sphere sovereignty primarily as an organizing metaphor. As a metaphor, I hope to
demonstrate, it is a valuable means of understanding the relationship between state, church, and society.
In response to the first objection, I acknowledge that there is a hint of
"bricolage"''0 to this project. This Article shows that sphere sovereignty is a
useful way of thinking about both First Amendment institutionalism and the
constitutional relationship between state and non-state entities in general,
even if the religious superstructure is stripped from the theory. Even those
who wholeheartedly share Kuyper's neo-Calvinist religious perspective
agree that sphere sovereignty can, and perhaps must, be adapted to changing
circumstances. In fact, other readers of Kuyper have insisted that for sphere
sovereignty to continue to thrive, we must "subject[ ] Kuyper's 'bits and
pieces' to considerable refinement in the light of contemporary questions and
concerns."' 0 4 At the same time, the version of sphere sovereignty that I present retains much-including the importance of the church as one of society's sovereign "spheres"-that Kuyper prized.
"02
Skeel, supra note 99, at 1508-09; see also id. at 1509 n.31 (noting that "several recent
articles drawing on Kuyper's sphere sovereignty may foreshadow the kind of sustained treatment that the literature so far lacks" and citing Cochran, Tort Law and Intermediate Communities, supra note 26, as an example).
"03See Mark Tushnet, The Possibilitiesof Comparative ConstitutionalLaw, 108 YALE L.J.
1225, 1226-30 (1999) (noting the dangers of "'borrowing' . .. solutions developed in one
system to resolve problems in another" and introducing the concept of "bricolage" in comparative constitutional analysis, which "assembl[es] ...something new from whatever materials
the constructor discover[s]").
04 Mouw, Some Reflections on Sphere Sovereignty, supra note 29, at 88 (quoting Jacob
Klapwijk, The Struggle for a Christian Philosophy: Another Look at Dooyeweerd, THE REFORMED J., Feb. 1980, at 15); see also Richard J. Mouw, Culture, Church, and Civil Society:
Kuyperfor a New Century, 28 PRINCETON SEMINARY BULL. 48, 55 (2007) (noting that sphere
sovereignty "has much to offer contemporary discussions of civil society, but not without
some serious reworking in the light of present-day conditions").
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To the second objection, I can offer the easy answer that this Article
adapts what is best of Kuyper's theory without requiring that its readers share
Kuyper's religious views. But I would go further and say that it is ultimately
unclear what such an objection means. If we adapt Kuyper's thought to our
own time and place-to a religiously pluralistic society in which Kuyper's
assumptions about the primacy of Calvinist thought cannot be assumed to
hold-then it is not clear that it is a distinctly "Christian" legal theory. 105 In
short, nothing in the Christian roots of Kuyper's theory should be threatening
to non-adherents, and much of it should be appealing.
Kuyper's account of sphere sovereignty centers around the authority
and coercive power of sovereignty: "the authority that has the right, the
duty, and the power to break and avenge all resistance to his will."' 16
Kuyper wrote in opposition to the predominant theories of sovereignty of his
day: popular sovereignty, which he feared would end with "the shackling of
liberty in the irons of State-omnipotence,"' 17 and state sovereignty, which he
believed led to "the danger of state absolutism."''08 For Kuyper, neither
course was acceptable.' °9
Drawing on fundamental Calvinist principles," 0 Kuyper offered a different conception of sovereignty:
This dominating principle [offered by Calvinism] was not,
soteriologically, justification by faith, but, in the widest sense cosmologically, the Sovereignty of the Triune God over the whole

Cosmos, in all its spheres and kingdoms, visible and invisible. A
primordialSovereignty which eradiates in mankind in a threefold
deduced supremacy, viz., 1. The Sovereignty in the State; 2. The
Sovereignty in Society; and 3. The Sovereignty in the Church."'

"I For a useful discussion of these issues, see Mark Tushnet, Distinctively ChristianPerspectives on Legal Thought?, 101 MICH. L. REv. 1858 (2003) (reviewing McConnell, Cochran,
and Carmella, eds., supra note 26). See also William Brewbaker, Who Cares? Why Bother?
What Jeff Powell and Mark Tushnet Have to Say to Each Other, 55 OKLA. L. REV. 533 (2002).
KUYPER, Sphere Sovereignty, in ABRAHAM KUYPER: A CENTENNIAL
1,461, 466 (James D. Bratt ed., 1998) [hereinafter KUYPER, Sphere Sovereignty]; see

106ABRAHAM
READER

also Bob Goudzwaard, Globalization, Regionalization, and Sphere Sovereignty, in RELIGION,
PLURALISM, AND PUBLIC LIFE: ABRAHAM KUYPER'S LEGACY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY,

supra note 29, at 325, 333 (noting that Kuyper's definition of sovereignty departs from the
usual uses of the word).
107 KUYPER, LECTURES, supra note 27, at 88.
108 HESLAM, supra note 96, at 104.
09 See, e.g., KUYPER, Sphere Sovereignty, supra note 106, at 464.
110See, e.g., Michael J. DeBoer, Book Review, 16 J.L. & RELIGION 855, 858 (2001) (reviewing POLmCAL ORDER AND THE PLURAL STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY

(James W. Skillen &

Rockne M. McCarthy eds., 1991)) (noting the relationship between sphere sovereignty and the
Calvinist tradition); Gordon Spykman, Sphere-Sovereignty in Calvin and the Calvinist Tradi-

tion, in EXPLORING
I

163 (David E. Holwerda ed., 1976) (same).

THE HERITAGE OF JOHN CALVIN
KUYPER, LECTURES, supra note 27, at 79; see

note 106, at 466.

also KUYPER, Sphere Sovereignty, supra
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Kuyper thus sees divine authority as delegated to a threefold array of
sovereigns: the state, society, and the church." 2 He emphasizes that these
are "separate spheres each with its own sovereignty.""' 3 These concepts
require some elaboration. But it is worth pausing to note the striking energy,
diversity, and pluralism-the "multiformity"' 4-of human existence implicit in Kuyper's vision. As Nicholas Wolterstorff observes, "The picture
one gets from Kuyper is that of human existence, seen in its totality, as
teeming with creative vitality."" 5
What role does Kuyper envision for each of these spheres? Let us take
' 6
them separately, beginning with "sovereignty in the sphere of Society.""
Although he sometimes describes the social spheres as being as various as
the "constellations in the sky,""' 7 Kuyper's Princeton Lectures offer a somewhat more measured picture:
In a Calvinistic sense we understand hereby, that the family,
the business, science, art and so forth are all social spheres, which
do not owe their existence to the state, and which do not derive the
law of their life from the superiority of the state, but obey a high
authority within their own bosom; an authority which rules, by the
grace of God, just as the sovereignty of the State does."'
The picture is thus one of a set of "distinct social spheres of activity"
centered around various commonly recognized social roles and activities." 9
This resembles Max Weber's description of modem existence as involving
the differentiation of various spheres of activity,2 0 although the animating
spirit of Kuyper's vision is strongly different from Weber's own. These activities are mostly distinct,' although obviously there may be overlapping
and blurring between them. They are all social and communal activities,
from the smallest unit, the family, up to churches, "universities, guilds,
[and] associations."'2
They may be functional in nature, and thus geographically widespread-a professional guild or social association, for instance-or geographically and sometimes politically distinct.'

112 See KuYPER, LECTuRES,

supra note 27, at 79.

3 KUYPER, Sphere Sovereignty, supra note 106, at 467 (emphasis in original).
114Id.
" Wolterstorff, The Things That Are Not Caesar's, supra note 25, at 6.
116 KuYPER, LECTURES, supra note 27, at 90.

WKUYPER, Sphere Sovereignty, supra note 106, at 467.

111KUYPER, LECTRES, supra note 27, at 90.
119
Wolterstorff, The Things That Are Not Caesar's, supra note 25, at 7.
120See id.; see also Storkey, supra note 94, at 191 (citing MAX WEBER, 1 ECONOMY AND
Soc'rY 41-62 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978)).
121See KUYPER, LECTURES, supra note 27, at 90-91.
122Id. at 96.
123Id. Kuyper thus adds that "the social life of cities and villages forms a sphere of

existence, which arises from the very necessities of life, and which therefore must be autonomous." Id.
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Autonomy is vital to this theory. Kuyper does not simply describe the
existence of these spheres; he argues that they are truly sovereign spheres,
which may not lightly be interfered with by any other sovereign. They are
coordinate with the state, not subordinate to it:
Neither the life of science nor of art, nor of agriculture, nor of
industry, nor of commerce, nor of navigation, nor of the family,
nor of human relationship may be coerced to suit itself to the grace
of the government. The State may never become an octopus,
which stifles the whole of life. It must occupy its own place, on its
own root, among all the other trees of the forest, and thus it has to
honor and maintain every form of life which grows independently
in its own sacred autonomy. 124
The state cannot intrude on these separate spheres, each of which shares in
the same divine authority that animates the state itself. 25 It may "neither
ignore nor modify nor disrupt the divine mandate, under which these social
spheres stand."'' 276 For Kuyper, this is "the deeply interesting question of our
civil liberties.'
Contrasted with society is the state, which Kuyper calls "the sphere of
spheres, which encircles the whole extent of human life."' 28 Although the
social spheres arise from "the order of creation,"'' 29 the state is an artifact,
albeit an essential one, of human sinfulness. 30 Government originated, not
as "a natural head, which organically grew from the body of the people, but
a mechanical head, which from without has been placed upon the trunk of
3
the nation."' '
Although the state is less organic than the social spheres, it still plays
an essential role in ensuring that all the spheres operate harmoniously and
according to their divine purpose-a role that Kuyper sees as evidence that
13 2
Calvinism "may be said to have generated constitutional public law."'
Kuyper describes the state as having three primary obligations:
It possesses the threefold right and duty: 1. Whenever different spheres clash, to compel mutual regard for the boundary-lines
of each; 2. To defend individuals and the weak ones, in those
spheres, against the abuse of power of the rest; and 3. To coerce all

124Id.

at 96-97.

121See id. at 91.
26
27

at 96.
.dat 91.

ld.

.28
KUYPER, Sphere Sovereignty, supra note 106, at 472 (emphasis omitted).
129 Id. at 469.
13 See Wolterstorff, The Things That Are Not Caesar's, supra note 25, at 13.
13' KuYPER, LECTURES, supra note 27, at 92-93.
132 Id. at 94.
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together to bear personal and financial burdens for the maintenance of the natural unity of the State.133
The state thus plays three central protective and boundary-maintaining
roles.134 The first category involves the state's "adjudication of intersphere
'
boundary disputes."135
The state has the duty to ensure that each sphere is
operating within its proper scope and not interfering with another.'36 The
second involves "intrasphere conflict."' 37 The state must not leave the
members of various social spheres to fend for themselves, but may intervene
to protect them from abusive treatment within a particular sphere. Finally,
the state has the power to act for "transspherical" purposes.'38 In modem
terms, the state may take measures for the provision of public goods: infrastructure, military protection, and so on.
Given its sweeping regulatory authority, it is unsurprising that Kuyper
should see the state as having a tendency "to invade social life, to subject it
and mechanically to arrange it."' 13 9 Conversely, the social spheres are bound
to resist the state's authority. Thus, "all healthy life of people or state has
ever been the historical consequence of the struggle between these two powers."140 According to Kuyper, the proper cure for this is "independence [for
each] in their own sphere and regulation of the relation between both, not by
the executive, but under the law."' 41 The sovereign state must learn to cooperate with the sovereign social sphere, so that both may achieve their dele142
gated purposes.
Finally, consider the sovereignty of religious entities. Although there is
no doubt that Kuyper sees a vital role for churches, 43 he is adamant on two
points: no single church should dominate, and the church is no more free
than the state to intrude outside its own proper sphere. On the first point,
although he acknowledges that Calvinism has at times asserted itself in ways
that run against either religious pluralism or liberty of conscience, 144 he insists that the truest principles of Calvinism require liberty for "the multiform
complex of all ... denominations as the totality of the manifestation of the

' Id. at 97; see also KUYPER, Sphere Sovereignty, supra note 106, at 467-68.
134See Mouw, supra note 29, at 89-90.

"' Id. at 89 (emphasis in original).
136 Id.
117Id. at 90 (emphasis in original).
138 Id. (emphasis in original).
39KUYPER, LECTURES, supra note 27, at 93; see also KuYPER, Sphere Sovereignty, supra
note 106, at 469.
140 KUYPER, LECTURES, supra note 27, at 94.
141Id.
142 See

id. at 97-98.

141See Wolterstorff, The Things That Are Not Caesar's, supra note 25, at 16 ("[Kuyper]

regarded the church as fundamentally unique, and regarded its autonomy under God as more
fundamental than that of any other institution.").
" See KUYPER, LECTURES, supra note 27, at 99.
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Church of Christ on earth."' 145 The state itself cannot interfere with religious
pluralism because it lacks the competence to make determinations about
who is the true church, and any interference with the church would fall
outside its sovereign duties and thus violate the principle of sphere sovereignty. 146 It is only a coordinate sovereign, and cannot choose a 47privileged
1
sect from among the churches, or resolve "spiritual questions."'
Just as the state is restricted to its proper sphere when it comes to either
cooperation or conflict with the church, so too the church is restricted to its
own sphere. Like all spheres, including the state, the church may tend to
overreach. 48 Sphere sovereignty thus implies that churches, like all other
spheres, must stay within their own province.
Finally, the church is bound not to overreach within its own sphere. In
appropriate "intraspherical" instances, to use Mouw's term, the state may
even be obliged to interfere: "The Church may not be forced to tolerate as a
member one whom she feels obliged to expel from her circle; but on the
other hand no citizen of the State must be compelled to remain in a church
149
which his conscience forces him to leave."'
In sum, Kuyper's vision of sphere sovereignty is one of guided and
divided pluralism. It is guided in that each sphere has "its own unique set of
functions and norms,"' 50 and all of them are expressions of God's ultimate
sovereignty. 5' It is divided in that each sphere, provided that it acts appropriately, is to remain sovereign, untouchable by church, state, or other social
institutions. Kent Van Til offers a metaphor that nicely captures Kuyper's
vision:
Imagine that a prism has refracted light into its multiple colors. These colors represent the various social spheres of human
existence-family, business, academy, and so forth. On one side
of the colored lights stand the churches-guiding their members in
"' Id. at 105. See generally id. at 99-105. Although Kuyper refers only to Christian sects,
he should not be read too narrowly. In fact, Kuyper "insisted on the inclusion of Jews within
the ambit of religious liberty," and at times suggested that all sects, and atheists too, are
entitled to liberty of conscience. WITTE, REFORMATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 98, at 323 n.7
(2007); see also STEPHEN V. MONSMA & J. CHRISTOPHER SOPER, THE CHALLENGE OF PLURALISM: CHURCH AND STATE IN FIVE DEMOCRACIES 59 (1997) ("Kuyper decisively, explicitly
rejected the creation of a theocracy where the state would promote Christian beliefs and values. Time and again he spoke in favor of, and when in political power worked for, a political
order that recognized and accommodated the religious pluralism of society.").
146 See KUYPER, LECTURES, supra note 27, at 105.
141Id. at 106.
148See, e.g., Mouw, Some Reflections on Sphere Sovereignty, supra note 29, at 99
("[Kuyper] was especially vocal ... about the dangers of an overextended church."); see also
id. at 106.
149 KUYPER, LECTURES, supra note 27, at 108; see also Mouw, supra note 29, at 100.
150
Mouw, supra note 29, at 100.
"I'Hence one of Kuyper's most famous phrases: "[N]o single piece of our mental world
is to be hermetically sealed off from the rest, and there is not a square inch in the whole
domain of our human existence over which Christ, who is Sovereign over all, does not cry:
'Mine!'" KUYPER, Sphere Sovereignty, supra note 106, at 488 (emphasis in original).
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the knowledge of God, which informs (but does not dictate) the
basic convictions of each believer. On the other side of the spectrum stands the state, regulating the interactions among the
spheres, assuring that the weak are not trampled, and calling on all
persons to contribute to the common good. Neither church nor
state defines the role of each sphere; instead, each derives its legitimacy and its role from God.52
B.

Roots, Shoots, and Relatives of Sphere Sovereignty

Sphere sovereignty is an interesting enough concept to be worthy of
examination on its own terms. But if a strong argument is to be made that it
should inform our understanding of the American constitutional structure, it
will be helpful to suggest ways in which Kuyper's vision is already immanent in American political and constitutional thought. As John Witte observes: "The American founders did not create their experiment on religious
liberty out of whole cloth. They had more than a century and a half of
colonial experience and more than a millennium and a half of European
experience from which they could draw both examples and counterexamples."' 153 Moreover, an argument for the usefulness of sphere sovereignty in
understanding and reshaping constitutional law may be more persuasive if
we can point to many similar approaches, both secular and religious, that
have been offered for mapping the social and constitutional structure of liberal democracies.
In combing through history for the roots, shoots, and parallel visions of
sphere sovereignty, however, we must begin by looking further back still, to
the Calvinist philosopher Johannes Althusius.'5 4 In Althusius we find many
of the roots of sphere sovereignty, and of some similar conceptions of the
role of both the state and non-state associations.
For Althusius, the private association is an important part of the organizing structure of society. Each such association is fundamentally responsible for its own self-government: "Proper laws (leges propriae) are
those enactments by which particular associations are ruled. They differ in

'52
Kent A. Van Til, Abraham Kuyper and Michael Walzer: The Justice of the Spheres, 40
J. 267, 276 (2005).

CALVIN THEOLOGICAL
153
TIAL

JOHN

WI-E, JR.,

RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT: ESSEN-

RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 1 (1st ed.

2000)

[hereinafter WrrrE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL

EXPERIMENT].

'" For relevant discussions, see Henk E.S. Woldring, Multiform Responsibility and the
Revitalization of Civil Society, in Lugo, ed., supra note 29, at 175, 177-80; WrrrE, REFORMATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 98, at 143-207 (2007); BRIAN TIERNEY, RELIGION, LAW, AND THE
GROWTH OF CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT 1150-1650, at

71-79 (1982).

Carl Esbeck argues that

we can look back further still, to the fourth century, for the roots of religious autonomy. See
Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment,supra note 10, at 1392.
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each specie of association according as the nature of each requires."' 55
These associations have distinct legal personalities. Members retain the
right to exit them, but so long as they remain in an association, they "must
yield to its internal norms and habits and must follow whatever internal
processes and procedures may exist for changing them."' 6 Althusius's approach was similar with respect to the church, which he treated in some of
his writings "as a private voluntary association, whose members elect their
own authorities and maintain their own internal doctrine and discipline, polity and property without state interference or support."' 57

Althusius does not rule out state regulation, by any means. The state
can intervene where necessary to "defend the fundamental rights of every
human being."'5 8 But the state's fundamental role is to encourage conditions
that "make it possible for participants of each association together to...
form a community that orders the life of participants through just laws of
159
their own making."'
Althusius provides the seeds of Kuyperian sphere sovereignty. He establishes a vision of "a civil society that is characterized by a variety of
private associations and a horizontal social order"; 160 the state has an important role to play, but its power "is restricted with respect to nonstate associations on the basis of the latter's authority."'' Although one must be cautious
in assuming Althusius's influence on later thinkers, 62 there is at least some
evidence that he did have an impact on a number of the thinkers we will
encounter in this sub-Part. The roots of sphere sovereignty thus arguably lie
deep in a historical tradition that predated and encompassed the American
experiment in religious liberty.
A number of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century writers saw the Dutch
experience, to which Althusius contributed, as "the beginning of modern
political science and of modern civilization."' 63 This included a number of
key figures in the American revolutionary period, such as John Adams,
Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison. 164 But the central set of American
ideas that is rooted in Calvinism and therefore linked to Kuyper's own con'I-Woldring, supra note 154, at 177 (quoting JOHANNES ALTH1JSIUS, POLITICA 21-22
(1995) (reprint of 3d ed. 1614)).
156 WITTE, REFORMATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 98, at 187.
' Id. at 196. But see id. (noting other aspects of Althusius's vision of church and state
that suggest a stronger alliance between the two).
58 Woldring, supra note 154, at 178.
15 9 Id. at 179.
160Id.
161 Id.

at 180.
1 See WrTE, REFORMATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 98, at 203-05.
163 Id. at 203 (quoting Thorold Rogers, Review of William E. Griffis, Brave Little Holland,
10 NEW ENGLAND MAG. 517, 520 (1894)).
"6See WITTE, REFORMATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 98, at 203-04. Witte cautions, however, that the precise influence of the Dutch experience on the American revolutionary thinkers
is "hard[ ] to document" and that, to the extent that Dutch history and ideas were well received in revolutionary America, those ideas "took on quite different accents and applications" there. Id. at 204.
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cept of sphere sovereignty lies not with the central revolutionary figures but
earlier still, with the early Puritan communities of colonial America. Kuyper
sees these figures as the spring that set American religious and political liberty in motion.
Kuyper was right to see an important link between the Puritan mindset
and his own, although he tended to overstate it."65 John Witte has identified
a number of strands of Puritan thought that complement the sphere sovereignty vision, and that we might thus see as embedding it in the American
political and constitutional structure.' 66 The Puritans' fundamental contribution to American constitutionalism was an understanding of rights and liberties based on the Calvinist doctrine of covenant. 167 Covenantal doctrine led
the Puritans to see church and state "as two separate covenantal associations, two coordinate seats of godly authority and power in society."' 168 For
example, in 1648, the preamble to the Laws and Liberties of Massachusetts
Bay pronounced: "[O]ur churches and civil state have been planted, and
grown up (like two twins)."' 69 "To conflate these two institutions would be
to the 'misery (if not ruin) of both.' """0 Church and state were each "an
instrument of godly authority," and each had its own part to play in "establish[ing] and maintain[ing] the covenantal ideals of the community."''
We should be wary of drawing too close a comparison between Kuyper
and the Puritans, even if Kuyper himself would have welcomed it. Although
church and state in the Puritan vision "remained separate from each other in
their core form and function,"' 72 in many respects the material and moral
support that each provided to the other were far greater than we would contemplate under either the mature system of American religious liberty or
under Kuyperian sphere sovereignty itself.' Nevertheless, many of the parallels between Kuyper and the Puritans are striking. At least part of the
Puritan conception of the state included a robust idea of associational liberty,
drawn from the Calvinist doctrine of covenant. This conception allowed the
church and other private associations substantial autonomy and saw them as
coordinate sovereigns, along with the state, in the social order.

165See,

e.g.,

JAMES BRYCE,

I THE

AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH

299 (1889) ("Someone

has said that the American Government and Constitution are based on the theology of Calvin
and the philosophy of Hobbes. This at least is true, that there is a hearty Puritanism in the
view of human nature which pervades the instrument of 1787.").
"6See WITrE, REFORMATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 98, at 152, 205 & 324; John Witte,
Jr., Blest Be the Ties That Bind: Covenant and Community in Puritan Thought, 36 EMORY L.J.
579, 594 (1987); John Witte, Jr., How to Govern a City on a Hill: The Early Puritan Contribution to American Constitutionalism,39 EMORY L.J. 41, 50-51 (1990).
167 See, e.g.,
WrrrE, REFORMATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 98, at 287.
168 Id. at 309.
169 WIrE, REFORMATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 98, at 309 (quoting LAWS AND LIBERTIES
OF MASSACHUSETTs BAY A2 (1648) (Max Farrand ed., 1929)).
17oId. (quoting LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY, supra note 169, at A2).
171Id. at 310.
172 Id.
73

1

See id.at 310-11.
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The Puritan influence was reflected in the American revolutionary period by such writers and political figures as John Adams. Adams admired
the Puritans' creation of "a comprehensive system of ordered liberty and
orderly pluralism within church, state, and society"' 7 4 and embraced at least
some degree of religious autonomy when he drafted the Massachusetts Con-

stitution of 1780.17 1 That constitution guaranteed churches the right to select
their own ministers without state interference, a right that is consistent with
the concept of sphere sovereignty. 176 The early constitutions of Connecticut,

Maine, and New Hampshire provided similar guarantees.' 77
The same pattern is apparent elsewhere in the history of the early Republic. Philip Hamburger observes that some members of the founding generation who supported religious exemptions might have refrained from
arguing for a general constitutional right to such exemptions because, at the
time, "the jurisdiction of civil government and the authority of religion were
frequently considered distinguishable."'' 78 Michael McConnell notes that
"[t]he key to resolving" church-state disputes in the Supreme Court during
the antebellum period "was to define a private sphere, protected against state
interference by the vested rights doctrine and the separation of church and
state."' 179 Thus, we might see the Puritans, among others, as having infused

American thought with some of the same ideas that would culminate in
Kuyper's writings on sphere sovereignty. 80 John Witte concludes his study

of the Puritans' place within early modem Calvinist thought on a useful note:
The fundamental ideas of Puritan Calvinism did, indeed, contribute to the genesis and genius of the American experiment in

ordered liberty and orderly pluralism. American religious, ecclesiastical, associational, and political liberty were grounded in funda-

mental Puritan ideas of conscience, confession, community, and
commonwealth. American religious, confessional, social, and po174Id.

at 277.
"' See id. at 292-93.
176 For discussion, see Joshua A. Dunlap, Note, When Big Brother Plays God: The Religion Clauses, Title VII, and the Ministerial Exception, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2005, 2016
(2007).
17 See id. at 2015-16.
'71 Philip A. Hamburger, A ConstitutionalRight of Religious Exemptions: An Historical
Analysis, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 915, 936 (1992); see also Thomas C. Berg, The Voluntary
Principle, Then and Now, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1593, 1610; John F. Wilson, Church and State in
America, in JAMES MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 97, 104-06 (Robert S. Alley ed., 1985)
(arguing that church and state in the colonial and post-colonial period stood in a position of
dual authority).
"9 Michael W. McConnell, The Supreme Court's Earliest Church-State Cases: Windows
on Religious-Cultural-PoliticalConflict in the Early Republic, 37 TULSA L. REV. 7, 42 (2001).
'8 See, e.g., Lupu & Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our Constitutional Order, supra note 19, at 38 ("[The founders decided on] a new experiment-one that
decoupled religious and civil institutions. This new government would have no jurisdiction
over religious matters, thus ensuring the autonomy of religious institutions and simultaneously
depriving these same institutions of any incentive to capture the organs of government to
further their religious missions.").

2009]

Churches as First Amendment Institutions

litical pluralism, in turn, were bounded by fundamental Puritan
ideas of divine sovereignty and created order.'
That the Puritans' worldview did not fall on barren soil is evident from
the writings of the most celebrated nineteenth-century observer of the American scene, Alexis de Tocqueville. A number of writers have noted the resemblance between Kuyper's pluralistic concept of sphere sovereignty and
Tocqueville's description of American society in the nineteenth century. 18 2
Tocqueville argued that "[r]eligion in America ... must be regarded as the
first [ ] political institution[ ],"I3 and linked religious associations' influence in forming the moral character and political development of the nation
with a vibrant conception of civil freedom and church-state separation. 18 He
also noted the presence in America of an "immense assemblage of associations," ' and argued that they formed a fundamental part of the governance
18 6
of a republic founded on notions of equality.
Importantly, Tocqueville "describ[ed] a religious spirit which he quite
specifically associated with Calvinist Protestantism-one which insisted on
clear separation of church and state, but at the same time fostered a 'structured politics of involvement' in which religious conviction and political organization reinforced each other."' 87 Thus, Tocqueville saw evidence in
nineteenth-century America that the Calvinist Puritan ideal had taken root:
in Kuyper's words, America had embraced a pluralistic system whose watchword was "[a] free Church in a free State."' 88 As John McGinnis has argued, that spirit continues to influence the Supreme Court's contemporary
rulings on federalism, freedom of association, and freedom of religion. 8 9
Thus far I have argued that Kuyper's vision of sphere sovereignty, although it was not articulated until the late nineteenth century, had antecedents in European developments that might have influenced American
thought. Moreover, it shares a close kinship with the sorts of social ideals
that were prized by the American Puritans, and that continued to influence
American thought well into the nineteenth-century America that Tocqueville
visited. But we can also find evidence of a Kuyperian concern with the
sovereignty of various non-state associations in a diverse array of other and

8 WrrE, REFORMATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 98, at 319 (internal quotations omitted).
See, e.g., Woldring, supra note 154, at 182-83; BOLT, supra note 96, at 133-86.
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106 (Alan Ryan ed., 1994)
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'4See id. at 304.
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See id. at 106-10.
' Elizabeth Mensch, The Politics of Virtue: Animals, Theology and Abortion, 25 GA. L.

1
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923, 1100 (1991) (quoting

SCIOUSNESS IN AMERICA 27
188KUYPER, LECTURES,
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supra note 27, at 99.
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prudence of Social Discovery, 90

CAL.

L. REV. 485 (2002).
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later thinkers. If these thinkers were not directly influential in shaping the
American worldview, they at least suggest the broader appeal of sphere sovereignty, or similar concepts, as a middle ground between statism and atomistic individualism.
Let me mention briefly two schools of thought, and linger a little longer
on a third. First, consider the school of "British pluralism."' 90 In keeping
with Kuyper's effort to locate sovereignty in a panoply of social institutions,
these writers attacked "unlimited state sovereignty," including the popular
variety instituted by the French Revolution. 191 They instead insisted on a
form of pluralism in which "self-governing associations" are vital in "organizing social life" and in which the state "must respect the principle of
function, recognizing associations like trade unions, churches, and voluntary
bodies."' 192 British pluralists like John Neville Figgis stressed that the state is

a sort of "society of societies, charged with the task of making the continued
existence and mutual interaction of such associations possible through setting rules for their conduct."' 193 Although the state might exercise regulatory
power, it did so in a manner that was "bounded by the behavior of other
groups, with law emanating from several sources.' 1 94 It is easy to see ech-

195
oes of Kuyperian sphere sovereignty in this language.
More broadly, consider those writers who have argued for the importance of mediating or intermediary institutions, which "stand[ ] between the
individual in his private life and the large institutions of public life."' 196 Mediating associations, including such Kuyperian staples as "family, church,

"9oFor introductions to British pluralism, see, for example, THE PLURALIST THEORY OF
THE STATE: SELECTED WRITINGS OF G.D.H. COLE, J.N. FiGGis, AND H.J. LASKI (Paul Q. Hirst
ed., 1989) [hereinafter THE PLURALIST THEORY OF THE STATE]; DAVID NICHOLLS, THE PLURALIST STATE

(1975);

CAROL WEISBROD, EMBLEMS OF PLURALISM: CULTURAL DIFFERENCES

111 -15 (2002).
' Paul Q. Hirst, Introduction to THE PLURALIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 190,
at 1-2.
92
1 Id. at 2.
' Id. at 17. For language that echoes both Kuyper and Figgis, see W. Cole Durham, Jr. &
Elizabeth A. Sewell, Definition of Religion, in RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES: A STUDY OF IDENTITY, LIBERTY, AND THE LAW, supra note 19, at 3, 35 ("In a pluralistic world, protection of religious freedom requires allocating the ultimate 'competence of competences' to the secular state.").
AND THE STATE

194

WEISBROD,

supra note 190, at 112.

For a modem example of a writer proceeding from a perspective of legal pluralism who
reaches conclusions similar to those drawn here, see Franklin G. Snyder, Sharing Sovereignty:
Non-State Associations and the Limits of State Power, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 365 (2004).
96
' PETER L. BERGER & RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, To EMPOWER PEOPLE: THE ROLE OF
MEDIATING STRUCTURES IN PUBLIC POLICY 2 (1977) (emphasis omitted); see also PETER L.
BERGER, FACING UP TO MODERNITY: EXCURSIONS IN SOCIETY, POLITICS AND RELIGION 130-41
(1977); MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE
'9'

109 (1991); SEEDBEDS OF VIRTUE: SOURCES OF COMPETENCE, CHARACTER, AND CIZENSHIP

INAMERICAN SOCIETY (Mary Ann Glendon & David Blankenhorn eds., 1995); Linda C. McLain & James E. Fleming, Some Questionsfor Civil Society-Revivalists, 75 CHI-KENT L. REV.
301, 309-10 (2000); Yael Tamir, Revisiting the Civic Sphere, in FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 214
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1998).
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voluntary association, [and] neighborhood,"' 197 are seen in this literature as
playing a vital role in helping individuals form and maintain a sense of identity in the face of the crushing pressure of the unified state. Writers in this
tradition emphasize the importance to the state of "protect[ing] and foster[ing] mediating structures," largely by leaving them alone, and of using
mediating structures to effect public policy rather than imposing these policies directly.1 98
Finally, consider the Catholic concept of subsidiarity.

199

The concept of

subsidiarity begins with an assumption that, rather than existing in isolation,
"the individual realizes his fulfillment in community with others." 2°° Thus,
the state should not exercise its regulatory authority "to the point of absorbing or destroying [private associations], or preventing them from accomplishing what they can on their own." 01 Although the state retains some
regulatory authority over associations, it should exercise that authority in a
way that "protect[s] them from government interference, empowering them
but effective intervention, or coordinating their various
through limited
'202
pursuits.
It would be going too far to argue that subsidiarity has directly influenced the historical development of American political thought. But, like
sphere sovereignty, the doctrine of subsidiarity has antecedents in many of
23
the thinkers who may have indirectly shaped the American landscape.
Subsidiarity can be understood and applied in ways that may help clarify and
refine American constitutional doctrine in a wide variety 2of4 areas, including
federalism, freedom of association, and religious liberty. 0
A number of writers have noted the connection between subsidiarity
25
and sphere sovereignty, which developed more or less contemporaneously.
Given the current popularity of subsidiarity as a tool in the legal literature, it
may be worth pausing to note the ways in which it is distinct from sphere
sovereignty. Perhaps the most crucial difference is that subsidiarity is often
assumed to involve a vertical ordering of relationships. It describes a hierarchy of associations, from "higher" to "lower," 206 with the state in the high197 BERGER,

supra note 196, at 134.

98 Id. at 138 (emphasis omitted).
199Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum: Encyclical Letter on Capitaland Labor (May 15, 1891), in

2 THE

PAPAL ENCYCLICALS

1878-1903, at 241 (Claudia Carlen ed., 1990). For a later descrip-

tion of subsidiarity that strongly resembles sphere sovereignty, see Paul VI, Encyclical Letter
Gaudium et Spes, para. 76 (1965) ("[I]n their proper spheres, the political community and the
Church are mutually independent and self-governing.").
" Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human
Rights Law, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 38, 43 (2003).
201Id. at 41.
202Duncan, supra note 89, at 72.
203 See Carozza, supra note 200, at 40-41.
204 See generally Duncan, supra note 89.
205 See, e.g., Mouw, supra note 29; Woldring, supra note 154; Van der Vyver, Sphere
Sovereignty of Religious Institutions, supra note 98, at 657-58.
206 See, e.g., Duncan, supra note 89, at 73.
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est practical position of authority and the church above the state.2 °7 Sphere
sovereignty, by contrast, envisions a horizontal social order, in which the
various spheres "do not derive their respective competencies from one another." 08 Given this horizontal ordering, the limited nature of state authority over other sovereign spheres is not just a matter of allowing the "lower"
orders to do what they can. Rather, "the boundaries that separate the
spheres are a part of the very nature of things. Neither the state nor the
church has any business viewing the other spheres as somehow under
2
them." 09
Despite this difference, subsidiarity and sphere sovereignty are in some
ways consistent. Their differences have certainly not prevented them from
becoming "conversation partner[s]." 210 For one thing, subsidiarity itself has
changed over time, in ways that deemphasize the hierarchical nature of the
social order.21' Moreover, sphere sovereignty itself, even if it treats all the
sovereign spheres as resting on equal authority, nevertheless permits state
intervention in appropriate cases, just as subsidiarity does.212 Both emphasize the centrality of a variety of private associations, including the church,
in our social order, and both would limit the state's intervention with respect
to those associations to foster their flourishing.
This Part has had two goals. First, it has offered a fairly detailed introduction to Kuyper's concept of sphere sovereignty. Second, it has argued
that sphere sovereignty does not stand alone in social thought. Rather, it is
part of a rich history of pluralistic conceptions of the state and of the role of
various private associations, including the church. Some of those conceptions draw on the same roots that Kuyper did. Even if Kuyper's emphasis on
the Puritan roots of American religious and political liberty attempted to
brush a number of other influences on American constitutionalism out of the
picture," 3 it is still true that the Puritans, who formed an influential strand of
207

See, e.g., Mouw, supra note 29, at 93 (citing

HERMAN DOOYEWEERD, ROOTS OF WEST-

127 (Mark Vander & Bernard Zylstra eds., John Kraay trans., 1979)). Dooyeweerd, it should be noted, was a critic of
subsidiarity for this reason, and so his description should not be taken as definitive.
208 Van der Vyver, Sphere Sovereignty, supra note 98, at 655.
209 MOUW, supra note 29, at 93.
210 Stackhouse, supra note 95, at xv.
211 See Sigmund, supra note 205, at 213; see also Patrick McKinley Brennan, Differentiating Church and State (Without Losing the Church), 6 GEO. J.L. & Pua. POL'Y (forthcoming
2008) (manuscript at 22) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1125441 ("In common parlance .... one hears that subsidiarity is the principle that ruling power should devolve to the
lower levels at which it can be exercised effectively. In Catholic social doctrine, however,
subsidiarity means what [Jacques] Maritain refers to as the pluralist principle: Plural societies
and their respective authorities must be respected.").
22 See Woldring, supra note 154, at 186-87 (concluding that "the differences between
subsidiarity and sphere sovereignty are in fact quite marginal").
213 See, e.g., James D. Bratt, Abraham Kuyper." Puritan, Victorian, Modern, in RELIGION,
ERN CULTURE: PAGAN, SECULAR, AND CHRISTIAN OPTIONS

PLURALISM, AND PUBLIC LIE: ABRAHAM KUYPER'S LEGACY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY,

supra note 29, at 3, 19-20.
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the American constitutional tradition, drew on the same sources and reached
some of the same conclusions. This leaves us with the possibility that the
ideas underlying sphere sovereignty are not alien but immanent in the American social and constitutional order. With that in mind, let us consider how
sphere sovereignty might be said to shape that order, and in particular how it
might influence the First Amendment institutional project.
IV.

COMBINING SPHERE SOVEREIGNTY AND FIRST
AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONALISM

Having laid out in substantial detail two seemingly disparate theoretical
projects-the study of First Amendment institutions and the neo-Calvinist
theory of sphere sovereignty-it remains to weave them together. Let us
begin with the contribution that sphere sovereignty might make to the constitutional landscape. To be sure, sphere sovereignty is not a programmatic
vision. 14 Still, it offers a surprisingly coherent and detailed vision of a pluralistic constitutional regime. It describes a legal order in which both the
presence and the importance of a host of intermediary institutions, ranging
from the small domestic order of the family to the substantial institutional
structure of the church, are central to a properly functioning society.
In doing so, sphere sovereignty serves as a valuable constraint on the
state in two senses. First, although it is highly respectful of the state, seeing
it as the "sphere of spheres," it does not enthrone the state as an absolute
good. At the same time that it recognizes the fundamental importance of the
state, it deemphasizes the state by describing it as just one among many
sovereign legal orders. Second, it limits the role of the state, preventing it
from becoming a suffocating octopus by limiting it to its proper sphere of
activity. Its role is not all-encompassing, but neither is the state rendered
either unnecessary or minimal. To the contrary, sphere sovereignty retains a
central role for the state, both in mediating between the various spheres and
in protecting the individual rights of the members of the spheres.
This approach is valuable for the development of individual and social
rights and relations. Sphere sovereignty does not ignore "the sovereignty of
'
the individual person."215
Kuyper emphasized that each individual is necessarily "a sovereign in his own person, 2' 16 and argued that a proper understanding of Calvinism required respect for "liberty of conscience," "liberty
'
of speech," and "liberty of worship."217
This is apparent in his description
of the state's central role in "defend[ing] individuals and the weak ones, in
[the various] spheres, against the abuse of power of the rest,"2 ' and in his
reminder that both church and state alike must "allow[] to each and every
14 See, e.g., Mouw, supra note 29, at 100-01.
215 KUYPER, LECTURES, supra note 27, at 107.
216 Id. (quotations and citation omitted).
217 Id. at 108 (emphasis omitted).
218 Id. at 97.
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citizen liberty of conscience, as the primordial and inalienable right of all
men."

2 19

At the same time, Kuyper does not repeat the frequent liberal mistake
of being inattentive to mediating structures in a way that ultimately leaves
"only the state on the one hand and a mass of individuals, like so many
liquid molecules, on the other. '220 His picture of human life, and of the
prerequisites for genuine human flourishing, is relentlessly social. It recognizes, as did Tocqueville, that institutions are essential for instrumental purposes that affect the individual on both a personal and a social level.
Personally, it recognizes that "[f]eelings and opinions are recruited, the
heart is enlarged, and the human mind is developed only by the reciprocal
influence of men upon one another. '22' Socially, it acknowledges that associations serve as a vital means of community in an egalitarian and commercial democratic republic which might otherwise render human life
intolerably atomistic. 2 2 But Kuyper's vision of the role of associations is not
merely instrumental. Rather, it sees associations as an intrinsic part of the
ordering of human existence, and honors these associations as a central and
divinely ordered aspect of human life.
This vision of sphere sovereignty maps onto a variety of aspects of the
constitutional structure. Writ small, it suggests something of the Court's
doctrine of substantive due process rights for families in directing the upbringing of children,223 the only remnants of the Lochner era to survive into
the present day. 224 Writ large, it is consistent with our larger system of federalism, which divides various regulatory matters among a multitude of
competing and cooperating sovereigns. 225 It also finds an echo in various
theories of localism, which similarly emphasize the key structural role
played in constitutional government by even smaller localities, such as
226
cities.

219Id.

at 108.

220 BERGER & NEUHAUS, supra note 196, at 4 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
22' 2 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 185, at 108-09.

222 See id. at 103 ("The Americans have
equality to keep men asunder, and they have
223 See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
510 (1925).
224 See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence

combated by free institutions the tendency of
subdued it.").
390 (1923); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S.

v. Texas: "The Fundamental Right" That Dare
Not Speak its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1931 (2004).
225See, e.g., Appiah, supra note 100, at 2388-89 (suggesting that sphere sovereignty "is
an idea one of whose applications is federalism").
226 See, e.g., David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley's City: Traces of Local Constitutionalism, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 487 passim (1999); David J.Barron, The Promise of Tribe's City:
Self-Government, the Constitution, and a New Urban Age, 42 TULSA L. REV. 811, 812 (2008)
(arguing, through the work of Laurence Tribe, for "an important constitutional vision in which
urban centers are central to securing the kind of self-government that, at bottom, our founding
charter is intended to promote"); David J. Barron, Why (and When) Cities Have a Stake in
Enforcing the Constitution, 115 YALE L.J. 2218 passim (2006); Gerald E. Frug, The City as a
Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1113-17 (1980); Richard C. Schragger, The Limits of
Localism, 100 MIcH. L. REV. 371, 371-76 (2001).
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However, for present purposes what is most significant about sphere
sovereignty is the contribution it makes to our understanding of First
Amendment institutionalism. First, it helps legitimate First Amendment institutionalism, 227 rooting a general intuition about the courts' failure to fully
account for the important role of various associations in a broader and more
firmly grounded theoretical structure. Second, it offers a surprisingly detailed set of justifications for First Amendment institutionalism and helps
provide at least the rudiments of a set of boundaries that help define First
Amendment institutions and their respective roles. It also offers a code of
conduct both for the institutions themselves and for the state as a regulatory
mechanism that mediates between them and protects the individuals within
them. Finally, and most importantly for this Article, sphere sovereignty offers an especially full and persuasive account of religious entities as First
Amendment institutions."'
We might ask more particularly what the picture we have drawn of
sphere sovereignty has to offer First Amendment institutionalism. What precisely is the vision of institutionalism that sphere sovereignty offers? Drawing on Kuyper, we can describe it in this way: sphere sovereignty offers a
vision of a vital, diverse, organic, and ordered legal pluralism.
Each of these terms has a particular meaning and implication for sphere
sovereignty and First Amendment institutionalism. By "legal pluralism," I
mean a regime in which it is recognized that a variety of "legal systems
coexist in the same field," and in which "legal systems" can include not
only judicial and legislative systems, but also "nonlegal forms of normative
ordering. '29 Legal pluralism thus stands against any theory of the state that
recognizes only one form of legal order, generally that of the state. It is
vital, as Wolterstorff recognizes, because Kuyper views the spheres as
"teeming with" creativity and energy. 30 It is diverse in the sense that
Kuyper acknowledges a whole host of spheres of human activity, including
but not limited to the church, the state, various private associations, the family, and even smaller governmental structures. Just as important, he recognizes that each of these spheres have a different purpose and function, and
thus will not operate in the same way and to the same ends. It is organic
because it does not simply take the value of the spheres as instrumental, or
as artificial constructs of human activity, but views them as intrinsically valuable and naturally occurring. Finally, sphere sovereignty is ordered in that
each sphere, having its own function and ends, also has its own role and its
227 See

Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, supra note 15, at 1145 (arguing that First

Amendment institutionalism still needs to be legitimated as a "theoretically grounded alternative to current First Amendment doctrine").
228 See, e.g., Garnett, Do Churches Matter?, supra note 21, at 293.
229 Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & Soc'y REV. 869, 870 (1988); see also
Cover, supra note 71, at n.36; John Griffiths, What is Legal Pluralism?, 24 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1 (1986); Bernard Roberts, Note, The Common Law Sovereignt. of Religious Lawfinders
and the Free Exercise Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 211, 217 n.31 (1991).
230 Wolterstorff, The Things That Are Not Caesar's, supra note 25, at 6.
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own limits, and is substantially self-regulating according to the nature and
traditions of the particular enterprise.23
Without wanting to overlook its attendant difficulties, it should be evident that this vision has many virtues. In both its broad outlines and its
internal structure and limits, it threads a middle path that avoids both statism
and atomistic individualism. It thus recognizes the "material and normative
dimensions of ...[various] forms of social order,"23 but acknowledges that
these forms of social order must also respect "the sovereignty of the individual person. '233 In Robert Cover's terms, it recognizes the "jurisgenerative"
power of the spheres as sovereigns, while providing at least the general outline of a mechanism for guarding against both "[v]iolence at the hands of
the state" and "violence [at the hands of] any nonstate community. '234
All of these virtues combine well with First Amendment institutionalism. Sphere sovereignty provides a valuable organizing metaphor for First
Amendment institutionalism in a variety of ways. Consider Kuyper's
description of a fairly discrete and finite set of social spheres, centered
around church, state, and society, each of which has an "independent character. '235 This organizing structure offers a valuable guide to the institutional variation and differentiation that the First Amendment institutional
project requires. Its description of the "threefold right and duty" 23 6 of the

state gives a greater shape to the sense of the scope and limits of institutional
autonomy under an institutional First Amendment approach.
In two important senses, sphere sovereignty also helps legitimize the
First Amendment institutional project. First, its depiction of the organic nature of the sovereign spheres-that is, its depiction of these spheres as both
identifiable and naturally occurring-helps allay concerns regarding the difficulty of spotting or defining particular First Amendment institutions. Second, to the extent that concepts like sphere sovereignty are drawn from a set
of ideas that also influenced the development of American constitutional
thought, this suggests that there is some support for a First Amendment institutional approach in the fabric of American constitutional culture. Sphere
sovereignty thus helps provide First Amendment institutionalism with a pedigree and a set of organizing principles.

23' For the same general concept, put in Kuyperian terms, see Spykman, supra note 110, at
167 ("Each sphere has its own identity, its own unique task, its own God-given prerogatives.
On each God has conferred its own peculiar right of existence and reason for existence.").
232 Post, supra note 55, at 1280-81.
233 KUYPER, LECTURES, supra note 27, at 107 (emphasis omitted).
234 Cover, supra note 71, at 51.
235 KUYPER, LECTURES, supra note 27, at 91. See also supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text (contrasting his earlier discussion of sphere sovereignty, which seems to allow for
an almost limitless number of spheres, with the discussion of sphere sovereignty in his
Princeton lectures, which suggests the existence of a smaller and more distinct number of
spheres).
236 KUYPER, LECTURES, supra note 27, at 97.

2009]

Churches as First Amendment Institutions

What might the organizing principles of a First Amendment institutionalism that draws on sphere sovereignty look like? To begin with, we could
expect a modified list of Kuyper's own version of the sovereign spheres to
emerge. That certainly includes religious entities, universities, libraries, and
various other private associations. The press' fundamental role as a counterweight to the state and its relatively well-established tradition of self-governance suggest that it should also be counted as a sovereign sphere. I have not
included on this list families, business enterprises, or local governments.
They are by no means completely excluded from an institutionally-oriented
constitutional account, but that does not mean they would count as First
Amendment institutions. As Frederick Schauer has written, most of us can
recognize that "a certain number of existing social institutions . . . serve
functions that the First Amendment deems especially important. '237 It is
these institutions that are the focus of this account.
With this starting point, a court examining a First Amendment question238 would not simply attempt to apply First Amendment doctrine in an
institutionally agnostic manner. Rather, it would proceed from the assumption that some institutions are at least "socially valuable," 23 9 and are also a
natural and intrinsically worthy part of both social discourse and individual
human flourishing. Accordingly, rather than engage in the kind of taxonomical inquiry it employs under current doctrine (Is this a state actor or a
public speaker? Is this regulation content-neutral, viewpoint-neutral, etc.?
Is this a limited-purpose public forum, a nonpublic forum, etc.?), a court
would ask a different set of questions. First, is this litigant a recognizable
First Amendment institution? In other words, is it an identifiable sovereign
sphere whose fundamental role in the social order is to contribute to public
discourse?
Second, a court would ask: what is the nature of this institution and its
participation in public discourse? Not all sovereign spheres are exactly the
same and neither are all First Amendment institutions. Although both the
press and universities ultimately contribute to the formation of public discourse, they do not do so in the same way. Understanding the role and
purpose of the institution under examination in a given case would give the
court a sense of the boundaries and norms of that institution.
This inquiry would lead in turn to the third question: what are the appropriate occasions for state intervention in the affairs of such a First
237 Schauer, InstitutionalFirst Amendment, supra note 53, at 1274.
238 1 assume, for now, that courts would employ these principles in

deciding questions
involving First Amendment institutions. For more discussion on this point, see, for example,
Hamilton, Religious Institutions, supra note 100, at 1195-97 (arguing, in the course of opposing religious autonomy altogether, that courts are ill-suited to make such determinations). See
also Mark Tushnet, Defending a Rule of InstitutionalAutonomy on "No-Harm" Grounds, 2004
BYU L. REv. 1375, 1383 (responding that the arguments for institutional autonomy are more
plausible than Hamilton recognizes, but suggesting that it is "a good idea to leave it up to
legislatures to define the contours of the rules of institutional autonomy").
239 Schauer, Institutional First Amendment, supra note 53, at 1275.
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Amendment institution? Factors to consider include: whether there is an
intersphere dispute between institutions, whether there is an intrusion on individual rights that calls for state intervention, and whether it is a transspherical dispute involving public goods and not the sovereign authority of the
First Amendment institution.
These three questions might be filled out with a few observations.
First, the fact that there are some appropriate occasions for state intervention
does not render them the rule rather than the exception. My starting assumption is that the rule would be one of autonomy or sovereignty within the
proper scope of each respective sphere or First Amendment institution. In
each case, "the argument would be that the virtues of special autonomy [for
these institutions] ... would in the large serve important purposes of inquiry

and knowledge acquisition, and that those purposes are not only socially
valuable, but also have their natural (or at least most comfortable) home
2 40
within the boundaries of the First Amendment.
Second, the fact that autonomy would apply within the proper scope of
each sphere suggests why a court, following something like Kuyper's approach,2 41 would need to inquire about the nature and purpose of each First
Amendment institution. Similarly, in order to understand both the purpose
of a First Amendment institution and the ways in which its self-regulation
may substitute for formal legal regulation by the state, it is necessary to
understand the fixed or evolving norms of self-governance driving each institution. To understand whether the press is acting sufficiently "press-like"
to merit a continuing claim of legal autonomy, we would ask whether it is
acting within something like its core purpose of discovering and disseminating information and commentary. We would also ask whether its professional norms serve the values that justify the existence and legal autonomy
of this sphere, and that can serve as a proxy for the kinds of regulatory
functions we might otherwise expect the government to undertake.
Finally, Frederick Schauer is right to argue that institutionalism need
not be a creature of the First Amendment alone. Schauer argues that the use
of institutional categories might involve not just what I have labeled First
Amendment institutions, but any number of institutions that have "important
institution-specific characteristics" that are germane to a variety of constitutional values, such as equal protection. 42 He also points out that while in
some cases First Amendment institutionalism might lead to "more" protection for a particular institution, in other cases institutionalism might lead to
"less" protection; some institutions might be "the loci of a range of dangers

240 Id.

at 1274-75.

24 1 These

are not Kuyper's views alone, however. Thus, Robert Post writes of the possibility of the Supreme Court refashioning First Amendment doctrine according to the "local and
specific kinds of social practices" that are relevant to the broader purpose of serving the underlying values of the First Amendment. Post, supra note 55, at 1272.
242 Schauer, Institutions, supra note 33, at 1757 n.51.
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which might militate especially strongly for restriction. ' 243 The important
point in both cases is that constitutional analysis should proceed by way of
institutional categories rather than institutionally agnostic doctrinal rules.
Given my focus on those "First Amendment institutions" that serve
positively to shape and enhance public discourse, I have left these other
institutions to one side. But the kinds of inquiries I have recommended
courts undertake certainly would not be irrelevant in other constitutional
fields. For instance, we might ask if the family serves particular interests,
like privacy, conscience-formation, and the transmission of both shared civic
virtues and localized diversity, that deserve protection under the Due Process
Clause or some other constitutional provision.244 Conversely, we might conclude that institutions such as businesses are spheres of social activity, but
that their purpose does not require substantial legal autonomy. Or we might
decide that state intervention is justified in a wider variety of circumstances
involving businesses because their interaction with other spheres may create
245
third-party victims who are not active participants in that sphere.
In short, a sphere sovereignty approach to First Amendment institutionalism would recognize a broad autonomy for at least some institutions that
are particularly recognizable and especially important for public discourse.
The scope of that autonomy would ultimately be shaped by the nature and
function of that institution and its capacity for self-regulation; the general
boundaries of state intervention would be drawn in something like the tripartite manner that Kuyper suggests. For at least those institutions I have highlighted, the result would be a greater degree of legal autonomy under the
First Amendment. Other institutions, like the family, might enjoy a substantial (but not unlimited) degree of autonomy, but this autonomy would not
derive from the First Amendment itself.
Although this discussion applies to the whole array of First Amendment
institutions, and perhaps to the constitutional treatment of institutions in general, it should be of special interest to the legal treatment of religious entities. It can hardly be doubted that religious entities fall within the category
of entities that help form, shape, and propagate public discourse, which is
the underlying justification for First Amendment institutions. Virtually all of
the "activities of religious groups are bound up with First Amendment purposes. 2 46 They are thus fitting subjects for treatment as sovereign spheres
under a First Amendment institutionalist approach.

243 Schauer, Institutional First Amendment, supra note 53, at 1276-77.
244 See Mark Tushnet, Defending a Rule of Institutional Autonomy on "No-Harm"

Grounds, supra at note 238, at 1381 & n.17 (suggesting that arguments for autonomy for
religious institutions may overlap with arguments for autonomy for "families or other nongovernmental organizations").
245 See, e.g., Siebecker, Building a "New Institutional" Approach to Corporate Speech,
supra note 81; Siebecker, Corporate Speech, Securities Regulation, and an InstitutionalApproach to the FirstAmendment, supra note 84; Blocher, supra note 6.
246 Brady, supra note 22, at 1710.
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If we allow for Kuyper's religious focus but expand it to include other
faiths,2 47 this is a recipe for the constitutional treatment of religious entities
as First Amendment institutions. There is some possibility that Kuyper's
description of the sovereignty of the church might have to do primarily with
the narrow categories of "worship, catechesis, and evangelism. ' 248 But this

assumption was likely grounded on the understanding that a variety of parallel organizations, each of them operating within a particular "sphere,"
would operate under religious principles and for the achievement of religious ends-sectarian trade unions, political parties, universities, and so on.
This principle of "pillarization

249

is less pronounced in the United States

than it was in nineteenth century Holland. Given the wide range of activities
and organizations in the United States that have a religious mission or would
consider 0themselves "religious," we can define "religious entity" fairly
2
broadly. 1
Under a sphere sovereignty approach to religious entities, the starting
assumption would be the same as that which applies to other First Amendment institutions: they should generally be treated as sovereign, or autonomous, within their individual spheres. 251 They would coexist alongside the

state, like other First Amendment institutions, serving a vital role in furthering self-fulfillment, the development of a religious community, and the development of public discourse. At the same time, precisely because they are

sovereign spheres, they would "live from their own strength on the voluntary principle. 2 52 Kuyper' s belief that the state lacks the competence and the
sovereign authority to authoritatively pronounce any sect to be the one true
church suggests that, even if his vision of establishment might be substantially different from our own,25 3 some version of non-establishment would

247 See supra note 145 and accompanying text (noting evidence that Kuyper's concern for
liberty of conscience extended beyond Christian sects, such as to Judaism and non-religious
individuals).
248 KUYPER, LECTURES, supra note 27, at 99.
249 See, e.g., Panel Discussion, Living With Privatization:At Work and in the Community,
28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1397, 1417 (2001) (remarks of Cathlin Baker) (describing the Kuyperian theory of pillarization, under which "each religious and/or moral community would have
its own schools, hospitals, and social service agencies; each faith and its own institutions
would constitute a pillar"); MONSMA & SOPER, supra note 145, at 61-62 (discussing the develand fate of pillarization in the Netherlands).
opment
250
See Brady, supra note 22, at 1692-98 (arguing that because "the aspects of church
administration that are quintessentially religious differ from group to group," particularly in a
religiously diverse society such as the United States, "the only effective and workable protection for the ability of religious groups to preserve, transmit, and develop their beliefs free from
government interference is a broad right of church autonomy that extends to all aspects of
church affairs").
25' Cf EEOC v. Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d 455, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (stating that churches
have "a constitutional right of autonomy in [their] own domain").
252 KUYPER, LECTURES, supra note 27, at 106.
253 See, e.g., Wolterstorff, The Things That Are Not Caesar's, supra note 25, at 18 (arguing
that Kuyper would regard our understanding of the Establishment Clause "as founded on untenable assumptions and hopelessly confused").
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necessarily be woven into the fabric of this approach.2 54 Thus, "a free
Church, in a free State": 255 a set of independent and largely autonomous
religious entities, operating according to their own purposes and within their
own sphere, not entitled to state preferment but also substantially immune
from state regulation.
All of this is consistent with the approach to First Amendment institutionalism that I outlined above. What sphere sovereignty adds to the picture
is a fairly detailed depiction of both the scope and limits of autonomy for
religious entities as First Amendment institutions, and historical support that
stretches as far back as Althusius's time, and which certainly includes important strains in American constitutional history itself.
V.

CHURCHES AS SOVEREIGN SPHERES AND FIRST AMENDMENT
INSTITUTIONS: SOME APPLICATIONS

A.

Introduction

In this Part, I consider some concrete applications of sphere sovereignty. My goal here is not to emphasize either the similarities or distinctions between such an approach and current doctrine concerning church-state
issues. In some cases, the outcomes will not differ greatly, perhaps reinforcing the thesis that some version of sphere sovereignty is consistent with our
constitutional framework. In other cases, this approach may lead to departures from current doctrine. Given the doctrinal confusion that reigns in this
area, 56 a sphere sovereignty/First Amendment institutionalist approach provides, first and foremost, stability and a more powerful set of tools to address these pressing questions. This approach lends a coherent set of
principles to the analysis of a wide array of problems in current religious
liberty jurisprudence.
One may expect reasonable disagreement about what a sphere sovereignty/institutionalist approach demands in particular cases. Nevertheless,
the resolutions I suggest below are attractive because they track each other
across doctrinal lines and are consistent with how we might approach similar
problems involving a range of other First Amendment institutions.

254 See infra Part V.E.
255 KUYPER, LECTURES, supra note 27, at 106.
256 See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 12, at 1061.
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Core Questions of "Church Autonomy"

Church Property Disputes

Consider first the core problem of "church autonomy." Church autonomy comprises a number of possible issues." 7 Some hints of what the doctrine entails, however, are found in one of the earliest discussions of this
doctrine. In Watson v. Jones,25 the Supreme Court examined a property dispute between competing factions of the Presbyterian Church in Louisville,
Kentucky, in the wake of the Civil War. In resolving the dispute, the Court
provided a number of fundamental principles that have guided questions of
church autonomy ever since.
The Court began by asserting that "[t]he law knows no heresy, and is
'
committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect."259
It
declined to adopt any approach to church property disputes that would require the courts to determine whether a particular religious institution or its
leadership had departed from established church doctrine. 260 Instead, it laid
down rules of conduct that varied according to the form of church polity in
question. Disputes within congregationalist churches independent of any
higher authority would be decided "by the ordinary principles which govern
voluntary associations. '26' Disputes within hierarchical religious organizations with established ecclesiastical tribunal procedures-such as the Roman
Catholic Church-would be resolved by accepting the decisions of the high262
est of these church judicatories as final.
This decision gave rise to a series of subsequent Supreme Court cases
that ratified some version of a deferential understanding with respect to
church disputes. 263 The Court has held that under the Religion Clauses, "the
civil courts [have] no role in determining ecclesiastical questions in the process of resolving property disputes,"' 64 and may not resolve "underlying
controversies over religious doctrine. ' '265 It has also suggested that "courts
may not make a detailed assessment of relevant church rules and adjudicate
between disputed understandings, ' 266 even if the underlying question is
267
whether the ecclesiastical tribunal has acted consistently with its own law.
More recently, the Court has allowed for broader discretion in the applica257 See Perry Dane, "Omalous"Autonomy, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1715, 1733-34.

80 U.S. 679 (1871).
Id. at 728.
260 See id. at 729.
261 Id. at 725.
262 Id. at 727.

258

259

263 KENT GREENAWALT,

I RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE AND FAIR-

265 (2006).
264 Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 447 (1969).
265 Id. at 449.
266 GREENAWALT, supra note 263, at 267.
267 Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 429 U.S. 696 (1976).
NESS
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tion of church property dispute doctrine. State courts may continue to follow the polity-centered rules the Court laid down in Watson. They may also
adopt a "neutral principles" approach, in which the court applies standard
legal doctrine to interpret authoritative church documents, provided that
these documents do not require the court to examine and interpret religious
language.26 s
These cases have generated their share of controversy, 269 but I want to
bypass those debates and focus on two points. First, the church property
disputes strike at the very heart of what Kuyper would have considered the
sovereign territory of religious entities, as opposed to the sovereign territory
of the state. In First Amendment institutionalist terms, these cases involve
issues that are fundamental to the functioning of religious entities, and
should be resolved by the norms of self-governance that apply within a particular religious institution, rather than by judicial resolution. Thus, the
courts should allow religious entities to resolve their own disputes, according to the norms that they select to govern themselves.
Second, courts should avoid misinterpreting the language of "neutral
principles" that the Supreme Court used in Jones v. Wolf. Perhaps because
the language is similar to the Court's later discussion in Employment Division v. Smith of "neutral, generally applicable law[s]," 270 some writers have
been tempted to treat the Court's invocation of "neutral principles" in both
Jones and Smith as "undercut[ting] any argument that [the Court's cases in
this area] guarantee a broad right of church autonomy."27 ' Perry Dane argues persuasively, however, that "[o]ther than an unfortunate coincidence
of language," the ideas in Smith and Jones v. Wolf "have little to do with
each other and ... cannot simply be strung together to suggest an erosion of
'
Rather, Jones recognized the profound
religious institutional autonomy."272
difficulty that courts face in resolving what Richard Mouw would call "in-

268 Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
269

See, e.g., Arlin M. Adams & William R. Hanlon, Jones v. Wolf: Church Autonomy and

the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1291 (1980); Ira Mark
Ellman, Driven From the Tribunal: Judicial Resolution of Internal Church Disputes, 69 CAL.
L. REV. 1378 (1981); John Garvey, Churches and the Free Exercise of Religion, 4 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 567 (1990); Louis J. Sirico, Jr., Church Property Disputes:
Churches as Secular and Alien Institutions, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 335 (1986).
270 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990).
27' Caroline Mala Corbin, Above the Law? The Constitutionality of the Ministerial Exemption from Antidiscrimination Law, 75 FOROHAM L. REv. 1965, 1987 (2007); see also Hamilton, Religious Institutions, supra note 100, at 1162-63 (characterizing the "neutral
principles" approach as sounding in utilitarianism rather than church autonomy); Jane Rutherford, Equality as the Primary Constitutional Value: The Case for Applying Employment Laws
to Religion, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1049, 1119 (1996) (characterizing both Jones and Smith as
cases involving "governmental neutrality" and not church autonomy); W. Cole Durham, Jr.,
Legal Structuring of Religious Institutions, in RELIGIOoS ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNrrED
STATES: A STUDY OF IDENTITY, LIBERTY, AND THE LAW, supra note 19, at 213, 220-21 (noting
and criticizing this phenomenon).
272 See Dane, "Omalous" Autonomy, supra note 257; see also Dane, The Varieties of Religious Autonomy, supra note 65.
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trasphere" church disputes involving contending claimants to the title of
"church." The Court's response in Jones-giving religious entities the opportunity to structure their own governing documents with secular language
state courts can read and enforce-was simply a vehicle by which the Court
could allow churches to "order[ ] [their own] private rights and obligations" in an enforceable manner that could "accommodate all forms of religious organization and polity." '73 Jones was, in short, an effort to
accommodate church autonomy, not to eliminate it.27 4 Whether or not the
neutral principles approach is an especially helpful one in settling church
property disputes, it should be clear that it does not contradict, but rather
serves, the principle of church autonomy.
2.

The Ministerial Exemption

Another broad category involving questions of "church autonomy"
concerns the so-called "ministerial exemption." Under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act, religious entities are immune from civil rights litigation in cases
concerning "the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association,
educational institution, or society of its activities.1 275 This provision does
not exempt churches from civil rights cases involving other protected categories such as race or sex.276 But the lower federal courts have widely
agreed that the Religion Clauses require a broader scope of immunity than
the statute provides, concluding that religious freedom "bars any inquiry
into a religious organization's underlying motivation for [a] contested employment decision" if the employee would "perform particular spiritual
'
functions."277
The ministerial exemption is not just a legal defense to an
employment discrimination action; it is a recognition
by the courts that they
278
lack the jurisdiction to examine these claims.
The question of who qualifies for the "ministerial exemption" has provoked a good deal of discussion.2 79 Several writers have argued that the
273Jones, 443 U.S. at 603-04.
274 See Dane, "Omalous"Autonomy, supra note 257, at 1743-44 ("What should be clear is

that the neutral principles approach only makes sense.., in the context of an effort to effectuate a religious community's effort to specify the form that community should take through
some type of private ordering.... [T]o confuse neutral principles of law with Smith's invocation of neutral, generally applicable law and, therefore, to employ it to reject claims of autonomy in the face of any secular and neutral regulatory regime ... is just flat wrong."); see also
Durham & Sewell, supra note 193, at 48 n.277 (same).
275 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a) (2000).
276 See, e.g., Raybum v. Gen. Conference of Seventh Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164,
1166 (4th Cir. 1985).
277 Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 304 (3d Cir. 2006).
278 See, e.g., Mark E. Chopko & Michael F. Moses, Freedom to Be a Church: Confronting
Challenges to the Right of Church Autonomy, 3 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 387, 414 & n.200
(2005) (collecting cases).
279 See Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions, supra note 13, at 1521
nn.142-45 and accompanying text (offering examples). Another issue in this area that has
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exemption itself is not required by the Religion Clauses and should be eliminated, subjecting religious entities to civil rights laws in the same manner as
any other employer.280
A First Amendment institutionalist approach supplemented by the concept of sphere sovereignty buttresses the arguments of courts and scholars in
favor of the ministerial exemption. If religious entities are to function as
sovereign institutions, they require a substantial degree of autonomy to make
their own decisions about whom they hire and fire: "The Church may not be
forced to tolerate as a member one whom she feels obliged to expel from her
circle." 8'
One might argue that only those employment decisions that are truly
religious fall within the proper sphere of religious sovereignty, and any decisions based on extrinsic factors such as race or sex fall outside the ambit of
its sovereign sphere. That argument is mistaken for a number of reasons.
First, the activity itself-hiring or firing an employee of a religious organization-remains squarely within the core activity of religious sovereignty,
even if the grounds for such a decision are questionable. Second, to determine whether or not the religious institution's basis for hiring or firing someone is truly extrinsic to its religious activities would require courts to make
determinations in cases where "the government lacks the data of
28 2
judgment.
Third, any state remedy would intrude on religious sovereignty-or, put
differently, the religious entity's integrity and usefulness as a First Amendment institution. A court-ordered reinstatement of such an employee would
require the religious entity to "tolerate" not just a member, but a minister or
other core employee "whom [the church] feels obliged to expel from [its]
circle. '283 This is equally true from a First Amendment institutionalist perspective. Since it assumes that religious and other First Amendment institutions are entitled to legal autonomy, it would be inappropriate for the state to
usurp that privilege of self-regulation by selecting the people who present
the institution's public face. Although an award of damages would be less
harmful than reinstatement, it would still effectively penalize the religious
entity for the exercise of the same privilege.

attracted considerable attention is whether the ministerial exemption is rooted in the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause, or both. In part because my sphere sovereignty-focused
institutional reading of the Religion Clauses ultimately flows from both Clauses, I do not
address that issue here. For discussion and citation to representative positions on this issue,
see Garnett, Religion and Group Rights, supra note 23, at 526-27 & nn.67-72. For a position
closer to my own, see Dane, supra note 257, at 1718-19 ("If the truth be told, institutional
autonomy is, strictly speaking, neither a matter of free exercise nor of establishment; rather, it
can most sensibly be understood as a distinct third rubric, grounded in the structural logic of
the relation between the juridical expressions of religion and the state.").
"80See, e.g., Rutherford, supra note 271; Corbin, supra note 271.
28' KUYPER, LECTURES, supra note 27, at 108.
282 Id. at 105.
283 Id. at 108.
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Thus, an institutionalist approach supports the courts' recognition of
church immunity with respect to those employment decisions that involve, at
least, the core decision to hire or fire "religious" employees. That immunity
should be read broadly. Courts should not be required to examine too
closely a religious institution's own claim that an employee is in fact a religious employee.
Furthermore, a sphere sovereignty or First Amendment institutionalist
approach would favor extending current doctrine with respect to the ministerial exemption. As the law currently stands, Title VII permits religious entities to discriminate against any employee, but only for religious reasons.
Conversely, the ministerial exemption forbids courts from examining cases
involving discrimination on any protected basis, but only where ministerial
employees are concerned. A more robust version of First Amendment institutionalism, however, would treat the question more categorically: churches
qua churches are entitled to a substantial degree of decision-making autonomy with respect to membership and employment matters, regardless of the
nature of the employee or the grounds of discrimination.
This raises the "Bob Jones problem": should religious entities be entitled to discriminate where other organizations cannot, even on forbidden
grounds such as race?28 4 One can, of course, deplore such acts of discrimination, especially when they are not deeply rooted in the religious policies of
a particular institution. A somewhat half-hearted response to this concern is
that Bob Jones itself did not simply involve internal affairs; it involved the
external question of how to apply the nation's tax laws.285 A Kuyperian or
First Amendment institutionalist approach would go further and suggest that
courts lack the jurisdiction to intervene in at least some cases. That does not
mean religious entities themselves are immune to internal or external moral
influence; it does mean that, absent extraordinary circumstances, these disputes should be self-regulated.
Deference to self-regulation, though disturbing in individual cases, is
justified in light of the institutional or Kuyperian value of church autonomy.
Moreover, the approach would place the doctrine on a firmer and clearer
footing than the current approach, which implicitly attempts to balance the
interests in each case. Arguments in favor of the ministerial exemption and
other aspects of church autonomy doctrine tend to be instrumental in na-

284 See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983) (upholding the denial

of a tax exemption to a university that forbade interracial dating between students on religious
grounds). See generally Cover, supra note 71. Although she does not mention Bob Jones,
Laura Underkuffler's worries about church autonomy appear to stem from similar concerns.
See Laura S. Underkuffler, Thoughts on Smith and Religious-Group Autonomy, 2004 BYU L.
REV.

1773.

285See Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Group Autonomy: Further Reflections About What Is

at Stake, 22 J.L. &
Autonomy].

REULI1ON

153, 153 n.5 (2006-2007) [hereinafter Brady, Religious Group
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ture. 286 Instrumentalist justifications are important and certainly consistent
with a First Amendment institutionalist account, but in a sense they may
concede too much by putting the argument in instrumental terms. Moreover,
they lend themselves to the kind of interest-balancing that has led courts to

deal clumsily with questions such as whether a particular position is "ministerial" in nature.
The blunter and more emphatic spirit of the sphere sovereignty approach may have something to contribute here. Religious entities are protected as a part of the social landscape not simply because they are
instrumentally valuable, but because they are intrinsically valuable, and a
fundamental part of a legally pluralistic society. The state is precluded from

interfering in church employment decisions not simply because it would be
problematic, but because the church's affairs are not the state's affairs; it
simply has no jurisdiction to entertain these concerns. A sphere sovereignty

approach to the question of church autonomy thus has more in common with
the state is jurisdicthe approach offered by Carl Esbeck, who argues that
7

tionally disabled from addressing these questions.2
Do church employment decisions fall within the scope of any of the
three occasions on which the state may interfere with the sovereignty of
another sphere? One could argue that fired church employees must be protected "against the abuse of power" within the sovereign spheres. 288 But this
takes Kuyper's exception too far. He recognized that the state may be forced
to intervene when a citizen is "compelled to remain in a church which his
conscience forces him to leave.1 289 In other words, forcing an individual to

stay in a religious community against her will violates the individual's own
sovereign conscience. That is a different matter from church employment
decisions, however, in which the church's own ability to select the composi-

tion of its members is at stake. From a strictly First Amendment institutionalist perspective, the result is the same. From a categorical perspective, what
should matter to the court is that it has identified the defendant as a relevant

First Amendment institution. Core decisions such as whom to employ
286

See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, The Voluntary Principle,Then and Now, 2004 BYU L. REV.
1593, 1613 (noting that courts often justify the ministerial exemption on the instrumental
grounds of judicial incompetence, and disagreeing with this emphasis); Brady, Religious Organizationsand Free Exercise, supra note 22, at 1699-1706 (focusing on the contribution that
religious groups make to democratic deliberation); Brady, Religious Group Autonomy, supra
note 285 (focusing on their contribution to the search for truth). This is an ungenerous characterization of Professor Brady's articles, whose broader argument is that our very inability to
determine conclusively what is true or false requires a space for religious groups to contribute
to this conversation, but it will serve for present purposes.
287 See, e.g., Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment,supra note 10; Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on Governmental Power, supra note 72. For a similar
approach, see Patrick M. Garry, The Institutional Side of Religious Liberty: A New Model of
the Establishment Clause, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 1155.
288 KUYPER, LECTURES, supra note 27, at 97. For such an argument, see, e.g., Rutherford,
supra note 271.
289 KuYPER, LECTURES, supra note 27, at 108 (emphasis added).
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should be resolved principally by the self-governance mechanisms of the
institution itself.
C. Sexual Abuse and Clergy Malpractice
Surely the most controversial issue that has arisen around claims of
church autonomy is the growing scandal over sexual abuse by members of
the clergy. Clergy sexual abuse has spawned an enormous volume of litigation, resulted in significant settlement payments and church bankruptcies,
and caused some traditional legal defenses to buckle under the sheer weight
of social disapproval. 90 It has also sparked some of the most vehement op29
position to the general principle of church autonomy. '
While this Article cannot address all the complex issues that this issue
has engendered, 29 2 a few words about the issue are important, because they
serve as a reminder that sphere sovereignty is not an absolute license. Most
writers who argue for church autonomy already strongly agree on this
point, 293 but it is still worth stressing, lest critics of church autonomy ad294
vance a straw-man argument along these lines.
Kuyper could not be clearer on this point: one of the occasions on
which it is most appropriate for the state to exercise its own sovereignty and
intervene in the sphere of religious sovereignty is when an institution has
behaved abusively toward one of its own members. 295 In those circumstances, the state is obliged to act to ensure the protection of the individual
'
"from the tyranny of his own circle."296
Thus, sphere sovereignty, even in
its strongest form, is not the equivalent of a general immunity from liability
for the sexual victimization of minors and adults. From a First Amendment
institutionalist perspective, however strong the interest in favor of institutional autonomy, it does not extend to cases involving these kinds of gross
harms. Rather than serve the underlying spirit of valuing institutions that
290 See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct and EcclesiasticalImmunity,
2004 BYU L. REV. 1789, 1792.
291See, e.g., Hamilton, Religious Institutions, supra note 100; Marci A. Hamilton, Church
Autonomy Is Not a Better Path to "Truth," 22 J.L. & RELIGION 215 (2006-2007); Marci A.
Hamilton, The Waterloo for the So-Called Church Autonomy Theory: Widespread Clergy
Abuse and Institutional Cover-Up, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 225 (2007).
292In addition to Lupu & Tuttle's comprehensive and superb article, supra note 290, see
Symposium, The Impact of Clergy Sexual Misconduct Litigation on Religious Liberty, 44 B.C.
L. REV. 947 (2003) and TIMoTHY D. LYIrON, HOLDING BISHOPS ACCOUNTABLE: How LAWSUITS HELPED THE CATHOLIC CHURCH CONFRONT CLERGY SEXUAL ABUSE

(2008).

See, e.g., Lupu and Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our Constitutional Order, supra note 19; Brady, Religious Organizationsand Free Exercise, supra note 22;
Durham & Sewell, supra note 193, at 80.
294 See, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton, The Catholic Church and the Clergy Abuse Scandal: Act
Three, Apr. 10, 2003, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/20030410.html ("The so-called
church autonomy doctrine is not really a legal doctrine at all .... Rather, it is an insidious
theory that invites religious licentiousness rather than civic responsibility.").
295 See KUYPER, LECTURES, supra note 27, at 97.
296 KUYPER, Sphere Sovereignty, supra note 106, at 468.
293
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contribute to self-flourishing and public discourse, immunizing religious entities in such cases would choke off public discourse by imprisoning its victims behind a wall of silence.
In short, however stringent a sphere sovereignty-oriented vision of religious entities as First Amendment institutions may be, it does not include
religious immunity from obviously harmful conduct. It does, however, suggest something about how we might go about intervening in these cases. We
should adopt a measure of caution, preventing courts or juries from deciding
numerous issues that range further afield from the abuse itself and closer to
297
the heart of the First Amendment institution.
Courts already recognize some of these dangers. Virtually every court,
for instance, has denied claims based on "clergy malpractice" because those
claims require courts to "articulate and apply objective standards of care for
the communicative content of clergy counseling, '298 striking at the heart of
religious entities as sovereign spheres and embroiling courts in questions
that they lack the competence to resolve. 99
Professors Ira Lupu and Robert Tuttle take this caution a step further,
applying a modified version of the Supreme Court's protective test in New
York Times v. Sullivan3°° to the realm of civil suits against religious entities
for sexual misconduct. 0' They suggest that courts should reject any regime
of tort liability that "imposes on religious entities a duty to inquire into the
psychological makeup of clergy aspirants,"3 °2 to avoid leading these institutions into a form of "self-censorship[ ] that is inconsistent with the freedom
protected by ecclesiastical immunity from official inquiry into the selection
of religious leaders."3 °3 By adapting the test of "actual malice" from New
York Times,3°4 they argue that religious officials should not be liable for
abuse committed by an individual clergy member unless the institution "had
actual knowledge of [its] employees' propensity to commit misconduct."'3 5
These and other measures would "give[ ] religious organizations 'breathing

297 Some possible issues include broad questions of entity responsibility, the manner of
selecting or monitoring religious officials, and questions of church structure and bankruptcy.
298

Lupu & Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical Immunity, supra note 290, at

1816.
299 See, e.g., Nally v. Grace Cmty. Church of the Valley, 763 P.2d 948, 960 (Cal. 1988);
William W. Bassett, W. Cole Durham, Jr. & Robert T. Smith, 2 Religious Ass'ns & L. (West)
§ 8:19 n.9 (2007) (listing cases).
3- 376 U.S. 254 (1964).

301See Lupu & Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct and EcclesiasticalImmunity, supra note 290, at
1859-84; see also Daryl L. Wiesen, Note, Following the Lead of Defamation: A Definitional
Balancing Approach to Religious Torts, 105 YALE L.J. 291 (1995).
302 Lupu & Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical Immunity, supra note 290, at

1860-61.
303

Id. at 1861.
304
376 U.S. at 279-80.
305

1862.

Lupu & Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical Immunity, supra note 290, at
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space' within which to organize their own polities, select their own leaders,
and preach their own creeds."31 6
This is consistent with my general approach toward religious entities as
First Amendment institutions, or sovereign spheres. It treats these entities as
lying largely beyond the jurisdiction of the state, and seeks to craft the law
affecting them in ways that give them the utmost freedom to shape and regulate themselves. Two aspects of this method are worth underscoring. First,
the immunity religious entities retain in these cases is limited; the state may
intervene to protect church members in appropriate cases. Second, there is a
difference between leaving open even a limited scope for religious immunity
in these cases and arguing that religious entities ought to be free to do
whatever they wish. First Amendment institutions are self-regulating institutions subject to internal critique and reform, non-legal public pressure, and
reputational forces. There is therefore reason to believe that even a limited
form of immunity would not prevent religious entities from self-regulating
to avoid the risk of sexual misconduct. Certainly they have every incentive
to do so, including the religious incentives that shape them and define the
core of their sovereign concerns.307
D. Free Exercise Questions and Smith

I have already noted the Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division v. Smith.30 Before Smith, religious claimants were entitled to put the
government to a test of strict scrutiny for religious burdens even where they
are caused by generally applicable laws. Smith dispensed with this test, concluding that generally applicable laws are entitled to no special level of scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause.3°9 Because the Smith Court cited its
own prior church property dispute decisions for the proposition that "[tihe
government may not.., lend its power to one or the other side in controversies over religious authority or dogma,"310 some courts3 1' and commentators3' 1 2 have argued that at least some form of compelled religious
accommodation for generally applicable laws involving religious groups survives Smith." 3
3
06 Id.

at 1860.

307 See id. at 1864-65.
30

See supra Part V.B. 1.
" Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990).
310 Id. at 877 (citations omitted).
31 See, e.g., Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church,
173 F.3d 343, 349 (5th Cir. 1999), EEOC v. Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d 455, 462 (D.C. Cir.
1996).
312 See, e.g., Brady, Religious Organizations and Free Exercise, supra note 22; Dane,
supra note 257.
313 But see Laura S. Underkuffler, Thoughts on Smith and Religious-Group Autonomy,
2004 BYU L. REV. 1773, 1775 n. I1(arguing that none of the cases cited in Smith with respect
to religious group autonomy "dealt with the central question in Smith, that is, religious exemptions from 'otherwise neutral' state laws").
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First Amendment institutionalism might seem inapplicable to cases involving individual rather than entity claimants. I want to argue, however,
that my sphere sovereignty approach does more than simply reinforce the
argument that the legal autonomy of religious organizations survives Smith.
It also substantially undercuts the very approach to Free Exercise questions,
whether for religious entities or religious individuals, that the Court endorsed in Smith.
Institutionalist critics of the Court's First Amendment doctrine note a
similar problem in other areas: the distorting effect of First Amendment
institutional agnosticism, and its reliance on what it imagines to be serviceable general doctrine in place of a more particularistic consideration of the
role and value of social practices that lie at the heart of the First Amendment. As Schauer notes, in Smith and similar cases "the Court has ... said
essentially nothing about any possible institutional variations among those
claiming exemptions or among the various regulatory schemes from which
exemptions were being claimed."3' 14 The Court's apparent view is that Free
Exercise doctrine would become too complicated, permissive, and inconsistent with its institutional agnosticism in a host of other fields if it considered
these questions in individual cases.
Sphere sovereignty calls this account into question. It suggests that any
exercise of state authority that falls within the proper scope of a coordinate
sovereign sphere, like a religious entity, is beyond the state's powers unless
one of a limited set of exceptions applies. If this view is correct, then the
reading of Smith that some commentators have offered must also be right:
religious groups must be entitled to a presumptive right to an exemption
from even generally applicable laws that intrude upon their sovereignty.
Sphere sovereignty allows for criticism of the rule in Smith even where
individual claims for religious accommodation are involved. First, sphere
sovereignty serves as a critique of the formation of constitutional doctrine in
ways that attempt to erase or ignore basic questions of social fact. Second,
as Kathleen Brady has demonstrated, it is hard to distinguish individual religious practice from group religious practice. In any communal religious
setting, individuals derive their religious obligations from those of the religious community as a whole. Their practices, and the burdens they experience at the hands of generally applicable and neutral laws, are thus part of
the broader fabric of the group religious experience.3 5 It is difficult to argue
in favor of the autonomy of religious groups without wondering whether the
Smith Court's refusal to grant similar exemptions to individuals is untenable.
This argument reads Smith in a way that undercuts the decision itself; it
does not lay to rest the Court's concern that granting individual exemptions
'
from generally applicable laws would be "courting anarchy."316
One can

314Schauer, Institutions, supra note 33, at 1756.

3 See Brady, Religious Organizations and Free Exercise, supra note 22, at 1675-76.
316Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990).
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understand why Brady conserves her energy for an effort to preserve religious group autonomy without attacking the core ruling of Smith itself. Absent a change in the Court's general approach to the Free Exercise Clause,
that argument is likely to prove futile. Nevertheless, an institutional or
sphere sovereignty account of religious freedom calls into question Smith's
refusal to countenance similar accommodations for individuals. At the very
least, we should ask whether, if the Court were more sensitive to the institutional context in which Free Exercise claims are made, it might also be more
sympathetic to some individual Free Exercise claims. It might ask, for example, whether the use of peyote is tied to the central practices of a particular faith,317 or how a government decision to build a road through the sacred
lands of an American Indian tribe might affect the ability of that community
to practice its religion as a whole.'
Would a group or individual claim to a Free Exercise exemption from a
neutral, generally applicable law fall within the limited set of cases where
state intervention is permissible? The answer, in most cases, will be no.
Such cases do not generally involve significant third-party costs, and certainly do not involve the risk of a religious institution abusing its own members. One could attempt to describe the general applicability of law as a
"public good," bringing such cases within the category of transspherical
matters that would allow state regulation. Aside from its flawed assumption
that the rule of law is too inflexible to allow for individual accommodations,3 19 this argument seems rather far afield from Kuyper's description of
such cases as instances in which the state can require everyone "to bear
personal and financial burdens for the maintenance of the natural unity of
the State."320
Smith is better understood as an example of interspherical conflict, in
which the state can "compel mutual regard for the boundary-lines of each"
sovereign sphere.32 ' However, this argument presupposes that religion trespasses on the sphere of state activity, while the state does not trespass into
the area of religious sovereignty. Nothing in the general account of sphere
sovereignty tells us who should win in such a dispute. It leaves the state as
the final arbiter of the dispute. That would be equally true in a regime in
which the state cannot, absent a compelling reason, interfere with individual
or group religious practices that fall within the core activities of the sovereign sphere. In such a regime, the hurdle would be higher, but the arbiter
would remain the same.
In sum, a First Amendment institutional account of religious freedom,
influenced by sphere sovereignty, would certainly limit the influence of
317See id. at 878.

See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Prot. Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
See, e.g., Ronald R. Garet, Three Concepts of Church Autonomy, 2004 BYU L. REv.
1349, 1364-67.
311
319

320 KUYPER, LECTURES,
321

Id.

supra note 27, at 97 (emphasis omitted).
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Smith in cases involving group religious practice. However, it would also
ultimately counsel reexamining Smith altogether, even in cases involving individual claims of accommodation.
E.
1.

Establishment Clause Issues

Two Categories of Establishment Clause Issues

What impact would an institutionalist account of the First Amendment
have on Establishment Clause cases? Some writers have argued that current
Establishment Clause doctrine is in serious tension with a sphere sovereignty
account of religious freedom. Johan Van der Vyver, for example, argues that
the separationist strand of Establishment Clause doctrine proceeds on the
mistaken assumption that "church and state, and law and religion, can indeed be isolated from one another in watertight compartments"; to the contrary, he argues, sphere sovereignty is based on "the encaptic intertwinement
'
Nicholas Wolterstorff is
of fundamentally different social structures."322
even more blunt, arguing that Kuyper, who envisioned a system of state
support for a variety of religious "pillars," would view the no-aid strand of
doctrine as "founded on untenable assumptions and
Establishment Clause' '323
hopelessly confused.
Wolterstorff may be right that the Court's Establishment Clause doctrine is hopelessly confused; he would not be the only one to draw such a
conclusion. 324 I am, however, less certain that either a sphere sovereigntydriven account or a First Amendment institutionalist account of religious
freedom would mandate a significant shift in Establishment Clause doctrine.
This is best seen by dividing the concerns arising under the Establishment
Clause into two categories: cases involving equal funding and equal access
to the public square for religious entities, and cases involving "symbolic
support" for religious entities.325
Kuyper was most concerned with questions of equal funding and equal
access for religious entities, especially "the equal funding of religiouslyoriented schools. '3 26 One could argue that a thorough-going approach to
sphere sovereignty or First Amendment institutionalism forbids any state
support of any kind for religion, since churches are supposed to "live from

322Van der Vyver, Sphere Sovereignty, supra note 98, at 662.
323Wolterstorff, The Things That Are Not Caesar's, supra note 25, at 18.
32 4

See, e.g.,

FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS,

THE

RHETORIC OF CHURCH AND STATE:

A

CRII-

CAL ANALYSIS OF RELIGION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 1 (1995) (collecting examples); STEVEN
D. SMiTH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIG-

IOUS FREEDOM 3-4 (1995) (same).

325 A third category-the interaction of the Establishment Clause and the regime of tax
laws and tax exemptions-will have to await another article.
326 Wolterstorff, The Things That Are Not Caesar's, supra note 25, at 18; see also Kobes,
supra note 95.
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their own strength on the voluntary principle. 3 27 Religious entities are only
one of the multitude of sovereign spheres, however. So long as those
spheres-voluntary associations of all kinds-are entitled to share in the
state's largesse, religious entities should be in a similar position, provided
that government does not interfere too much in their internal operations. My
account suggests that religious entities should be entitled to equal access to
funding for various government programs that are available to secular entities, including school vouchers. Certainly, if we value religious entities as
valuable contributors to public discourse, they should be as free to engage in
public speech as any other group.
The law is already moving in this direction. The Supreme Court has
recently shifted towards the view that government funds may flow to religious organizations, provided that aid is apportioned on an equal basis with
aid to secular private education.32 8 By this logic, any choice to avail oneself
of state funding in order to attend a religious school is a product of true
private choice.329 Similarly, on equal access issues, the Court has emphasized that religious entities are as entitled as any secular entities to engage in
speech in the public square, including the use of public fora such as afterhours public school programs. 3 0 Thus, the one area in which both a sphere
sovereignty account and an institutionalist account might counsel a change
in Establishment Clause doctrine is already changing.
Aside from the funding cases, the other major battleground in Establishment Clause litigation concerns "symbolic support": cases in which the
government's allegiance and endorsement is sought for a variety of practices,
" ' or the placement
such as the invocation of God in a public school setting33
332
of public displays such as a creche or the Ten Commandments.333
On these questions, my account favors prevention over permissiveness.
Both First Amendment institutionalism and sphere sovereignty agree with
the basic principle that "[t]he sovereignty of the State and the sovereignty
of the Church" are mutually limiting, and that both are harmed if they intertwine.334 From a First Amendment institutionalist perspective, granting religious entities legal autonomy allows them to conduct and regulate their
own practices, in part because religious entities can serve as a vital indepen-

supra note 27, at 106.
See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793

327 KUYPER, LECTURES,
328

(2000).
329

See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652; Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 810.
330 See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch. Dist., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Lamb's

Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge ofAllegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but
Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REv. 155, 220 (2004).
331See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
332 See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
133 See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005); Van Orden v. Perry, 545
U.S. 677 (2005).
334 KUYPER, LECTURES, supra note 27, at 107.
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dent source of ideas and public discourse. 35 On this view, religious entities,
among other functions, "mark the limits of state jurisdiction by addressing
33 6
If
spiritual matters that lie beyond the temporal concerns of government.
the goal of First Amendment institutionalism is to preserve a strong set of
institutions that promote free and open public discourse, it would be inconsistent with that goal to allow the state to openly side with or promote particular religious speech or expressive conduct.
Sphere sovereignty seems to point in the same direction. A government
that truly "lacks the data of judgment" on religious questions and lacks the
sovereign prerogative of "proclaim[ing] [a religious] confession as the
'
confession of the truth"337
has no business weighing in on religious questions or endorsing particular religious messages. Kuyper might have viewed
the question differently. The best reading of sphere sovereignty's application
in the American context, however, is that it should, if anything, support a
reasonably robust view of the Establishment Clause in symbolic support
cases, not a permissive one.
2.

Coda: Of Standing, Structure, and Sphere Sovereignty

One final issue merits brief discussion: the law of standing as it relates
to Establishment Clause challenges. The Supreme Court has generally denied standing in cases in which individuals assert nothing more than a "generalized grievance" in their capacity as taxpayers. 38 In Flast v. Cohen,
however, the Court carved out a narrow exception to this practice in Establishment Clause cases involving Congress's expenditure of funds pursuant to
its taxing and spending powers.339
This exception has been narrowly applied since Flast.3 40 Recently, in
Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. ,41 the Supreme Court further signaled its skepticism about the narrow space carved out by Flast, giving rise to the possibility that the Establishment Clause exception to the rule
will be narrowed or eliminated altogether.3 42 The Hein Court held that, although the funds at issue had been provided by Congress as part of its gen133 See,

04.

e.g., Brady, Religious Organizationsand Free Exercise, supra note 22, at 1700-

336

Id. at 1704; see also Bradley, supra note 12, at 1084-87.
at 105-06 (emphasis omitted).
23 (1998); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S.
166, 180 (1974); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 228 (1974).
"9 See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 105-06 (1968) ("[A] taxpayer will have standing
consistent with Article III to invoke federal judicial power when he alleges that congressional
action under the taxing and spending clause is in derogation of those constitutional provisions
which operate to restrict the exercise of the taxing and spending power.").
3' DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 348 (2006) (discussing the Court's
"narrow application" of Flast).
341 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007).
342 See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Ball on a Needle: Hein v. Freedom From
Religion Foundation, Inc. and the Future of Establishment Clause Adjudication, 2008 BYU L.
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338 See, e.g., FEC v. Akin, 524 U.S. 11,
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eral appropriation to the Executive Branch for day-to-day activities, that
connection was too distant to bring the expenditure within the Flast exception. The spending, it said, "resulted from executive discretion, not congressional action. 3 43 Concurring in the judgment, Justice Scalia, joined by
Justice Thomas, called the majority's distinction between executive and congressional expenditures unprincipled, and would have overruled Flast
altogether. 344
The approach to religious entities as First Amendment institutions that I
have offered here would check the trend against taxpayer standing in Establishment Clause cases represented by Hein. This point has been examined
most thoroughly by Professor Carl Esbeck, who argues that the recognition
of standing for "non-Hohfeldian injur[ies] '3 45 involving religion is appropriate if we understand the Establishment Clause as "a structural restraint on
governmental power" that "negate[s] from the purview of civil governance
all matters 'respecting an establishment of religion.' "346 That view is consistent with the sphere sovereignty approach, and with the treatment of religious entities as First Amendment institutions. This approach treats religious
entities as enjoying a form of legal sovereignty and immunity as a fundamental part of the legal structure rather than as a matter of state generosity.
On this view, the sovereignty of First Amendment institutions is as much a
part of our system of constitutional checks and balances as the sovereignty
of states, and broad standing is necessary to curb "official action that undermines the integrity of religion."'3 47 Just as church autonomy is a non-waivable doctrine for reasons relating to the fundamental role of religious entities
and other First Amendment institutions in the body politic, so citizens should
have broad rights to enforce the fundamental principle that church and state
should be maintained within their own separate jurisdictions. Ultimately, a
sphere sovereignty approach to religious entities as First Amendment institutions would buttress taxpayers' ability to enforce the Establishment Clause
precisely to preserve and maintain the integrity of religious entities as sovereign spheres.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In this Article, I have argued for the usefulness of sphere sovereignty as
an organizing metaphor for constitutionalism in general. Sphere sovereignty
offers a coherent and attractive way of understanding the role and importance of a variety of nonstate institutions including religious entities and a
143

Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2566.

344Id. at 2579, 2584 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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variety of other social spheres, and their relationship with a somewhat chastened state. In particular, I have argued that sphere sovereignty helps to
legitimate and structure an institutionalist understanding of the First Amendment-one that breaks from the Supreme Court's institutionally agnostic approach to constitutional doctrine, and instead accords a good deal of legal
autonomy to particular institutions that serve a central role in organizing and
encouraging public discourse and human flourishing.
Certainly religious entities meet any reasonable definition of a First
Amendment institution. Their fundamental social role cannot be denied;
they are a well-established part of the social and constitutional structure and
they are, for the most part, if not always, substantially self-regulating institutions whose own norms and practices often serve as a suitable substitute for
state regulation. If religious entities are understood as sovereign spheres and
as First Amendment institutions, we may find coherent, consistent, and attractive answers to a host of difficult doctrinal questions that continue to
bedevil us and that may represent the newest front in the battle over churchstate relations.
That contribution would be valuable enough. Perhaps, though, this approach offers even more. At the end of his classic article on nomic communities and the law, the late Robert Cover wrote strikingly:
[J]ust as constitutionalism is part of what may legitimize the
state, so constitutionalism may legitimize, within a different
framework, communities and movements. Legal meaning is a
challenging enrichment of social life, a potential restraint on arbitrary power and violence. We ought to stop circumscribing the
3 48
nomos; we ought to invite new worlds.
Kuyper might have said that those worlds are not new, but are as old as
creation; a First Amendment institutionalist might add that they are longstanding and remarkably stable artifacts of public discourse. But Cover's
words, and his advice, are nevertheless appropriate here. In thinking about
churches and other First Amendment institutions as sovereign spheres, we
encounter limits on the state's power to circumscribe; we invite new worlds.

-8 Cover, supra note 71, at 68.

